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In Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court swept away long-standing 
limits on corporate spending in federal elections, but it also strongly affirmed 
the constitutionality of robust disclosure and disclaimer requirements. In the 
wake of that decision, many proponents of campaign finance regulation have 
turned their attention to disclosure as the best remaining mechanism by which 
to regulate money in elections. At the same time, opponents of campaign finance 
regulation-including the legal team behind Citizens United-have trained 
their sights on disclosure, filing new challenges to existing disclosure require-
ments in a number of state or federal courts, although so far with only limited 
success. 
Relying on the Longitudinal Elite Contributor Database (LECD)-an origi-
nal database developed by one of the authors to track the population of unique 
individual campaign contributors from 1980 through 2008-this Article tests 
the Supreme Court's rhetoric about disclosure, and some of the premises of our 
current policy debates about money in politics, against the realities of the FEC's 
existing disclosure regime. In particular, we find that compliance with existing 
disclosure regulations is inconsistent and that the current regime fails to 
identify the most potentially influential players in the campaign finance system. 
In so doing, the current system/ails to provide basic facts about how candidates 
(and committees) finance their campaigns. We suggest that much of what the 
Court and reformers assume about disclosure is wrong-that their views are 
premised on an effective and well-functioning disclosure regime that in fact 
bears scant resemblance to the system of disclosure maintained by the FEC. 
Correcting these misunderstandings will be critical to crafting better reform 
proposals. And the stakes could not be higher: disclosure may well be the only 
constitutionally viable and politically feasible method of regulating money in 
elections in a post-Citizens United world. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Disclosure is the next front in the battle over money in politics. In Citizens 
United v. FEC, the Supreme Court swept away long-standing limits on corpo-
rate spending in federal elections, but it also strongly affirmed the constitu-
tionality of robust disclosure and disclaimer requirements. 1 Four years later, 
in McCutcheon v. FEC, the same Court invalidated the aggregate contribution 
limits for individual contributors in federal elections, but again appeared to 
endorse the constitutionality of disclosure. 2 In the aftermath of those decisions, 
many proponents of campaign finance regulation have turned their attention 
to disclosure as the best remaining constitutionally viable and politically fea-
sible mechanism by which to regulate money in elections.3 At the same time, 
opponents of campaign finance regulation-including the legal team behind 
Citizens United-have trained their sights on disclosure, filing new challenges 
to existing disclosure requirements in at least twenty-eight state or federal 
courts,4 although so far with only limited success.5 
1. 558 U.S. 310,319 (2010). 
2. 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442, 1459--o0 (2014). 
3. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Updating Disclosure for the New Era of Independent Spending, 
27 J.L. & PoL. 683, 718 (2012) ("Our laws are reasonably effective at obtaining and publicizing the 
identities of those who contribute directly to candidates; it is now critical that the laws be updated to 
make them effective at disclosing the donors to independent committees."); Richard L. Hasen, Chill 
Out: A Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J.L. & POL. 
557, 572 (2012) ("In the post-Citizens United era, when the country will be increasingly awash in 
money flowing through various organizations in order to hide its true sources, mandated disclosure can 
serve the important interest in deterring corruption and providing valuable information to voters."); 
Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Has the Tide Turned in Favor of Disclosure? Revealing Money in Politics After 
Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1057, 1102--03 (2011) ("[D]isclosure is the 
primary means left for regulating independent spending within the campaign finance context."); see 
also, e.g., Heather K. Gerken et al., Rerouting the Flow of 'Dark Money' into Political Campaigns, 
WASH. PosT. (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/rerouting-the-flow-of-dark-money-
into-political-campaigns/2014/04/03/l517acbe-b906-l l e3-9a05-c739f29ccb08_story.html ("Given how 
much of the campaign-finance system the court has eviscerated in recent years, disclosures are 
becoming the only game in town."). 
4. See CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., LEGAL CHALLENGES TO STJITE & FEDERAL DISCLOSURE LAWS POST-CITIZENS 
UNITED (2013), available at http://www.democracy21.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/CLC-
DISCLOSURE-CHART-4-26-13-2.pdf; see also Stephanie Mencimer, The Man Behind Citizens United 
Is Just Getting Started, MOTHER JONES, May/June 2011, available at http://www.motherjones.com/politics/ 
2011/03/james-bopp-citizens-united. 
5. See ·CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., supra note 4; see also Mencimer, supra note 4; infra section I.B.3. 
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In this transformed campaign finance landscape, an intense debate continues 
to rage, in both reform and scholarly circles, about how to address the presence 
within the electoral arena of so-called dark money organizations, which typi-
cally do not disclose their donors.6 Although they differ in their particulars, 
proposals frequently focus on increasing disclosure, either by expanding the 
reach of existing disclosure laws to clearly require disclosure to the Federal 
Election Commission (FEC) by entities that at present do not disclose, 7 or by 
empowering new entities, primarily the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) 
or the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), to require disclosure through new 
mechanisms or under new frameworks. 8 
Expanding disclosure is unquestionably critical if disclosure is to achieve the 
lofty goals we have assigned to it. But more disclosure is not enough; rather, the 
existing disclosure regime is deeply flawed in ways that neither the Supreme 
Court nor many reformers have acknowledged. And genuine reform of our 
6. These organizations poured unprecedented sums of outside money into the 2012 presidential and 
congressional elections: over $300 million in total and, by some estimates, a remarkable 31% of all 
outside spending in the 2012 cycle. See BLAIR BoWIE & ADAM L10z, BILLION-DOLLAR DEMOCRACY: THE 
UNPRECEDENTED ROLE OF MONEY IN THE 2012 ELECTIONS 7 (2013), available at http://www.demos.org/ 
publication/billion-dollar-democracy-unprecedented-role-money-2012-elections. Outside spending nearly 
tripled from 2010 to 2012, id. at 4, and shows no signs of abating in the 2014 midterm elections. See 
Andy Kroll , Follow the Dark Money, MOTHER JoNES, July/August 2012, available at http:// 
www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/06/history-money-american-elections; see also Richard Briffault, 
Two Challenges for Campaign Finance Disclosure After Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 19 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTs. J. 983, 1005-10 (20ll) (overview of the legal and regulatory context of the post-
Citizens United rise of "dark money"). 
7. See, e.g., Briffault, Updating Disclosure, supra note 3; Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding Behind the 
Tax Code, the Dark Election of 2010 and Why Tax-Exempt Entities Should Be Subject to Robust 
Federal Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, 16 NEXUS 59, 92-93 (20ll). This has been true of each 
iteration of the Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections (DISCLOSE) 
Act, a post-Citizens United legislative measure that has now been introduced in Congress unsuccess-
fully three times. The most recent version of the DISCLOSE Act would have, among other things, 
mandated disclosure to the FEC of the identities (names, addresses, and total contributions during the 
political cycle) of any donor who contributed over $10,000 to an organization involved in political 
spending, unless that donor expressly prohibited the organization from spending the contribution on 
electioneering activity. See S. 3369, ll2th Cong. § 324(a)(2) (2012); Campaign Finance Disclosure 
Rules: Hearing on S. 2219 Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., ll2th Cong. (2012) (statement of 
Richard L. Hasen, Chancellor's Professor of Law and Political Science, University of California, Irvine 
School of Law). 
8. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate Political 
Spending, 101 GEo L.J. 923, 925 (2013) (arguing that "the SEC should develop rules requiring public 
companies to disclose political spending to shareholders"); Donald B. Tobin, Campaign Disclosure and 
Tax-Exempt Entities: A Quick Repair to the Regulatory Plumbing, IO ELECTION L.J. 427, 440 (20ll) 
(recommending that the Treasury "promulgate regulations requiring tax-exempt organizations ... to 
disclose contributions and non-employee expenditures in excess of $25,000"); see also Lili Levi, Plan 
B for Campaign-Finance Reform: Can the FCC Help Save American Politics After Citizens United?, 
61 CATH. U. L. REv. 97, IOI (20ll) (arguing that the FCC can use existing authority "to require 
third-party purchasers of airtime for political and advocacy advertising to disclose their major direct 
and indirect funding sources and principal directors, officers, or operators"); cf Guidance for Tax-
Exempt Social Welfare Organizations on Candidate-Related Political Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. 71 ,535 
(proposed Nov. 29, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposing new framework for determining 
eligibility for tax-exempt status under § 501 ( c )( 4) ). · 
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disclosure rules will require not just expanding their reach, but also changing 
the mechanisms by which data on spending in elections are collected, main-
tained, and disseminated. These reforms are especially pressing in light of the 
Supreme Court's decision in McCutcheon v. FEC,9 which was handed down as 
this Article went to press. McCutcheon's invalidation of the overall contribution 
limits-that is, the limits on the amount any individual could contribute in a 
single election cycle to all federal candidates and political committees com-
bined-is likely to result in significantly greater sums of money pouring into the 
regulated coffers of federal candidates and committees. That additional money 
will all be subject to the FEC's existing disclosure requirements, but, as we 
show below, those requirements are unlikely to "offer[] a particularly effective 
means of arming the voting public with information," 10 as the McCutcheon 
Court reasoned. 
In this Article, we focus on the well-established disclosure regime of the 
FEC, the regulatory body charged with maintaining disclosure records for the 
bulk of political money that flows through American federal elections. In 
particular, we concentrate our analysis of the current disclosure regime on 
individual contributors in federal elections. These individual contributors, not 
political action committees (PACs), are the source of the lion's share of funding 
to congressional candidates, and in recent elections, to political parties as 
well. 11 And given the Court's holding in McCutcheon, these donors are poised 
to play an even larger role in how American elections are financed. 
Relying on the Longitudinal Elite Contributor Database (LECD)-an original 
database developed by one of the authors to track the population of unique 
individual campaign contributors from 1980 through 2008-this Article as-
sesses the Supreme Court's rhetoric about disclosure and some of the premises 
of our current policy debates about money in politics in light of the reality of the 
FEC's existing disclosure regime. By investigating the contours of the disclo-
sure regime vis-a-vis the most significant source of political money to congres-
sional candidates-individual contributions-we suggest that much of what the 
Court and reformers assume about the reality of disclosure is wrong. In par-
ticular, contributor compliance with providing required information-such as 
address and occupation-is often both inconsistent and partial. Further, the lack 
of an infrastructure to track individual contributors over time impedes the 
identification of the most potentially influential players in the campaign finance 
9. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
10. Id. at 1460. 
l I. See Robert Biersack & Melanie Haskell, Spitting on the Umpire: Political Parties, the Federal 
Election Campaign Act, and the 1996 Campaigns, in FINANCING THE 1996 ELECTION 155-59 (John C. 
Green ed., 1999); David B. Magleby, Adaptation and Innovation in the Financing of the 2008 
Elections, in FINANCING THE 2008 ELECTION 1, 30 (David B. Magleby & Anthony Corrado eds., 2011); 
Norman J. Ornstein et al., Vital Statistics on Congress, BROOKINGS INST. ch. 3 (Mar. 14, 2013), http:// 
www.brookings.edu/ /media/Research/Files/Reports/2013/07 /vital %20statistics%20congress%20mann 
%20omstein/Vital%20Statistics%20Chapter%203%20%20Campaign%20Finance%20in%20Congressional 
%20Elections.pdf. 
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system and, before the Court's decision in McCutcheon v. FEC, led to routine 
violations of th~ aggregate election cycle limits. Given these deficiencies, we 
argue that the Court's (and many reformers') views of disclosure are premised 
on an effective and well-functioning regime that in fact bears very little 
resemblance to the system of disclosure maintained by the FEC. Correcting 
these misunderstandings will be critical to crafting better reform proposals. 
The first Part of this Article defines disclosure in the context of campaign 
finance reform and surveys the legal landscape surrounding disclosure, both in 
the courts and in the context of FEC interpretation. The next Part describes the 
interests the Supreme Court has identified in disclosure-an informational 
interest, an anticorruption interest, and an enforcement interest-then turns to 
an assessment of the empirical literature on the effects of disclosure on voters. 
Having examined both the basic premises of our disclosure debates and the 
existing empirical literature on disclosure, the Article then draws on original 
research to identify a number of systemic flaws in the FEC's mechanisms for 
collecting, maintaining, and disseminating information. Finally, the Article . 
provides a number of recommendations for improving FEC practices in ways 
that will better align the reality of disclosure with both the Supreme Court's 
rhetoric about disclosure and the findings in the empirical literature regarding 
the ways to maximize the impact of disclosure. 
I. THE LAW OF DISCLOSURE 
A. DISCLOSURE DEFINED 
At its most basic, disclosure is a regulatory technique that requires '"the 
discloser' to give 'the disclosee' information which the disclosee may use to 
make better decisions." 12 
The authors of the seminal text Full Disclosure describe a type of disclosure 
they term "targeted transparency" -a category that includes campaign finance 
disclosure-as a regulatory method that rests on the "mobilization of individual 
choice, market forces, and participatory democracy through relatively light-
handed government action." 13 All targeted transparency schemes, they explain, 
include the following characteristics: (1) "mandated public disclosure," (2) "by 
corporations or other private or public organizations," (3) "of standardized, 
comparable, and disaggregated information;'' (4) "regarding specific products or 
practices," (5) "to further a defined public purpose."14 And although such 
schemes involve less extensive governmental action than more traditional regu-
latory techniques, "targeted transparency policies are characterized by a distinc-
12. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 
647,649 (2011). 
13. ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF 
TRANSPARENCY 5 (2007). 
14. Id. at 6. 
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tive and demanding architecture." 15 
In the campaign finance context, the term "disclosure" is actually used, in 
both case law and scholarship, to refer to at least three distinct activities, all 
broadly designed to promote transparency in political campaigns: the report-
ing, 16 primarily to the FEC in the federal system, 17 of campaign expenditures, 
contributions above a certain amount, and certain other entity-specific informa-
tion; the public dissemination of various categories of information about cam-
paign activities, particularly in the form of large-scale databases containing 
contribution and expenditure records; and the provision of disclaimers, which 
supply the public with immediate access to identifying information about the 
proponents of particular political messages. Nested within each of these catego-
ries is "a host of specific questions" 18 regarding the timing, frequency, and 
actual content of reporting; the timing and form of public dissemination; the 
content of disclaimers; and, with respect to all of these activities, issues of 
enforcement. 
In the following sections, we examine the substantive law of disclosure, in 
both the courts and the FEC. We then unpack disclosure from two different 
perspectives: first, what the Supreme Court and post-Citizens United lower 
courts have said about the interests disclosure serves; and second, what the 
social science literature shows about how disclosure advances those interests. 
We then address some of the systemic flaws in the federal disclosure system as 
currently constituted. Finally, we tum to a series of recommendations for better 
aligning the reality of disclosure with its identified goals. 
B. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE RHETORIC OF DISCLOSURE 
1. Disclosure Jurisprudence Before Citizens United 
Federal law has long mandated certain types of campaign-related disclo-
sures. 19 The Supreme Court first approved the constitutionality of a campaign 
15. Id. at 39. This architecture, the authors continue, typically includes a "specific policy purpose," 
"specified discloser targets," "a defined scope of information," "a defined information structure and 
vehicle," and "an enforcement mechanism." Id. 
16. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy further divides this sort of disclosure into two types: "(l) entity-wide 
disclosure that is applied to candidate campaign committees, political action committees, and political 
parties and (2) event-triggered disclosure that is initiated by purchasing a political advertisement that 
applies to any purchaser." Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 3, at 1058 (emphasis added). 
17. There are exceptions to this, qowever; Senate candidate reports, for example, are filed with 
the Secretary of the Senate. See 2 U.S.<; . § 432(g)( I) (20i 2). In addition, "[a]ll states require some level 
of disclosure from candidates, committees, and political parties of the amount and source of contribu-
tions and expenditures," with various state agencies charged with overseeing such disclosures. Cam-
paign Finance Reform: An Overview, NA'.l''L CONFERENCE OF STA'.I'E LEGJSL!JURES, http://www.ncsl.org/ 
legislatures-elections/elections/campaign-finance-an-overview.aspx#Disclosure (last updated Oct. 3, 
2011). 
18. Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273,277 (2010). 
19. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 61 (1976) (per curiam); see also Trevor Potter & Bryson B. 
Morgan, The History of Undisclosed Spending in U.S. Elections & How 2012 Became the "Dark 
Money" Election, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & Pua. PoL' Y 383, 385 (2013) ("Disclosure of the 
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fi,nance disclosure law in 1934,20 but the Court's first extended discussion of 
disclosure came forty years later in Buckley v. Valeo,2 1 the Court's foundational 
consideration of the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act 
(FECA).22 
In addition to its well-known holdings affirming the constitutionality of 
FECA's contribution limits23 and striking down its expenditure limits,24 the 
Buckley Court upheld FECA's reporting and disclosure requirements in full. 25 
The relevant provisions of the law required political committees26 to register 
with the newly created FEC, and to keep detailed records of both expenditures 
and contributions over ten dollars (just names and addresses for contributors 
over $10, occupations and places of business for contributors over $100).27 
FECA also required both candidates and political committees to provide quar-
terly reports to the FEC, detailing both contributions and expenditures,28 which 
the FEC would then make available "for public inspection and copying."29 
Finally, the law required all individuals or groups that made independent 
expenditures of over $100 per year30 "'for the purpose of ... influencing' 
the ... election of any person to federal office" to file a statement with the 
Commission. 31 
The Buckley Court began its discussion of disclosure by noting that mandated 
sources of funds spent to influence federal elections has been a core tenet of federal campaign finance 
law in the United States for more than a century."). 
20. See Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934) (sustaining an indictment under the Federal 
Corrupt Practices Act for conspiracy to violate the Act's requirement that any presidential campaign 
committee designate a treasurer and provide the House of Representatives with information regarding 
donors to the committee). For a comprehensive overview of the Supreme Court's pre-Buckley treatment 
of disclosure, see generally Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure, supra note 18; Briffault, Two 
Challenges, supra note 6. 
21. 424 U.S. I (1976). 
22. Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971 , Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972), 
amended by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431 (1974)). 
23. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26 (upholding FECA's contribution limits as justified by the Act's 
"primary purpose to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual 
financial contributions"); see also id. at 38 (upholding FECA's aggregate contribution limit). 
24. See id. at 39-59 (finding FECA's independent expenditure limit, limit on candidates' personal 
expenditures, and limit on overall campaign expenditures unconstitutional under the First Amendment). 
The Buckley Court also found that congressional appointment of members of the FEC was an 
unconstitutional infringement of the separation of powers. See id. at 143. 
25. See id. at 83-84. The Court did, however, limit political committee disclosure to organizations 
whose "major purpose .. . is the nomination or election of a candidate." Id. at 79. 
26. When Buckley was decided, FECA defined a political committee as "a group of persons that 
receives 'contributions' or makes 'expenditures' of over $1,000 in a calendar year .... 'for the purpose 
of ... influencing' the nomination or election of any person to federal office." Id. at 62---03 (quoting 
2 U.S.C. § 431 (Supp. IV 1970)). 
27. See id. at 63 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 432 (Supp. IV 1970)). 
28. See id. 
29. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
30. See 2 U.S.C. § 43l(e) (Supp. IV 1970). 
31. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 63---04 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 431(e)(l), (f)(I) (Supp. IV 1970)). 
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disclosure "can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaran-
teed by the First Amendment."32 This meant, the Court explained, that dis-
closure requirements could not be justified "by a mere showing of some 
legitimate governmental interest."33 Rather, such requirements "must survive 
exacting scrutiny,"34 which requires both a sufficiently important government 
interest and a "'relevant correlation' or 'substantial relation' between the govern-
mental interest and the information required to be disclosed."35 The Court then 
found that the governmental interests advanced in support of the statute's 
disclosure requirements did satisfy the "exacting scrutiny" the Constitution 
required. 36 Those interests, the Court explained, were three. The first has come 
to be known as the "informational" interest: 
[D]isclosure provides the electorate with information "as to where political 
campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate" in order 
to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek federal office. It allows voters 
to place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than is often 
possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches. The 
sources of a candidate's financial support also alert the voter to the interests to 
which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate predic-
tions of future performance in office. 37 
Second, the Court found that disclosure furthered the governmental interest 
in preventing both corruption and the appearance of corruption. The Court 
concluded that "exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of 
publicity" was likely to "discourage those who would use money for improper 
purposes either before or after the election."38 Similarly, disclosure equipped 
the public to monitor any special treatment that might flow from substantial 
financial support. 39 · 
Finally, the Court concluded that disclosure was key to what has come to be 
known as the "enforcement interest" in policing compliance with other parts of 
the law-that is, that the law's "recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure require-
ments" functioned as an "essential means of gathering the data necessary" to 
police compliance with FECA's other provisions, in particular its contribution 
32. Id. at 64. To underscore the significance of this interest, the Court pointed to cases like NAACP 
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,466 (1958) (holding that Alabama could not compel the state chapter of the 
NAACP to disclose the names of its staff and members), and Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 527 
(1960) (holding that the City of Little Rock could not demand lists of NAACP members and staff). 
33. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248, 257 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 393 
U.S. 14 (1968)). 
36. Id. at 64-66. 
37. Id. at 66-67 (footnote omitted). 
38. Id. at 67. 
39. See id. 
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limits.40 
While affirming the weightiness-both individually and cumulatively-of 
these interests, the Court also considered the interests on the other side of the 
balance-the potential threats disclosure requirements posed to First Amend-
ment rights, particularly the rights of association and associational privacy.41 
Though it acknowledged the importance of those interests, the Court found that 
the governmental interests in disclosure were "sufficiently important to out-
weigh the possibility of infringement [of First Amendment rights], particularly 
when the 'free functioning of our national institutions' is involved."42 The 
Court credited the argument that harassment and reprisal could sometimes result 
from governmentally compelled disclosure, but found that the plaintiffs had 
offered no evidence of such harassment or intimidation as a result of FECA's 
disclosure requirements.43 It made clear, however, that minor parties and candi-
dates might qualify for exemptions from disclosure requirements by demonstrat-
ing a "reasonable probability" that disclosure would result in "threats, harassment, 
or reprisals."44 
After its general discussion of disclosure, the Court then separately addressed 
the requirement that even independent organizations and individuals disclose 
contributions or expenditures over $100 made for the purpose of influencing 
federal elections.45 P~rceiving a potentially problematic vagueness in the require-
ment, the Court read the provision narrowly, as applying only to "contributions 
earmarked for political purposes or authorized or requested by a candidate or 
his agent, to some person other than a candidate or political committee" and 
"expenditures for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat 
of a clearly identified candidate."46 As narrowed, the Court concluded that the 
independent contribution and expenditure disclosure provisions did advance a 
substantial governmental interest by "shed[ ding] the light of publicity on spend-
ing that is unambiguously campaign related but would not otherwise be re-
ported."47 The Court found that such disclosure requirements were "responsive 
to the legitimate fear that efforts would be made ... to avoid the disclosure 
requirements by routing financial support of candidates through avenues not 
40. Id. at 67-68. 
41. This discussion occurred primarily in the context of the Court's evaluation of the argument that a 
blanket exemption to the disclosure requirements was warranted for independent and third-party 
candidates, but its general interest-balancing analysis was not by its terms limited to that context. See 
id. at 72-74. 
42. Id. at 66 (quoting Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. !, 97 (1961)). 
43. See id. at 72. 
44. Id. at 74. In Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 102 (1982), 
the Court found that the Socialist Workers Party was entitled to such an exemption from Ohio's 
campaign finance disclosure law. 
45. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74-82. 
46. Id. at 80. In a footnote, the Court elaborated on "express advocacy" as involving "express words 
of advocacy of election or defeat, such as 'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for 
Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' 'reject."' Id. at 44 n.52. 
47. Id. at 81. 
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explicitly covered by the general provisions of the Act."48 
Buckley, in sum, broadly upheld disclosure requirements for candidates and 
campaigns, as well as third parties, and further found that such requirements "in 
most applications appear to be the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of 
campaign ignorance and corruption that Congress found to exist. "49 
Following Buckley, the Court cited disclosure requirements with apparent 
approval in a number of cases.50 But its next extended discussion of disclosure 
did not come until the 2003 case McConnell v. FEC,51 in which the Court 
considered a broad challenge to the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
(BCRA),52 the most important piece of campaign finance legislation since 
FECA. The McConnell Court divided sharply on the constitutionality of the 
law's substantive provisions, with a narrow majority upholding the law's exten-
sion of the prohibition on corporate "express advocacy" in the immediate 
pre-election period to include "electioneering communications," a broader cat-
egory of communications that swept in many so-called issue ads that had 
previously escaped regulation. 53 
48. Id. at 76. The statute at issue in Buckley did not require independent spenders to disclose their 
donors, but the 1979 amendments to the FECA unambiguously introduced such a requirement. See 2 
U.S.C. § 434(b)(3)(A) (2012); Potter & Morgan, supra note 19, at 420-21. 
49. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68. 
50. See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 223 (1999) (O'Connor, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]otal disclosure has been recognized as the essential 
cornerstone to effective campaign finance reform and fundamental to the political system." (alteration 
in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 
479 U.S. 238, 262, 265 (1986) (invalidating FECA's independent corporate expenditure limitations as 
applied to a nonprofit ideological corporation, but also citing with approval the disclosure provisions 
that continued to apply to the plaintiff group, and noting that "[t]hese reporting obligations provide 
precisely the information necessary to monitor MCFL's independent spending activity and its receipt 
of contributions"); First Nat'I Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 & n.32, 795 (1978) 
(invalidating Massachusetts's limitations on corporate spending on ballot initiatives, and remarking that 
"the people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the 
relative merits of conflicting arguments"; that "[t]hey may consider, in making their judgment, the 
source and credibility of the advocate"; and that "[i]dentification of the source of advertising may be 
required as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be able to evaluate the arguments to which 
they are being subjected"). And, although the Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce did 
not consider disclosure in its opinion upholding Michigan's prohibition on corporate expenditures in 
state elections, Justice Kennedy invoked disclosure in his dissent, arguing that the ban was unnecessary 
in part because "[t]he more narrow alternative of recordkeeping and funding disclosure is available." 
494 U.S. 652, 707 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure, 
supra note 18, at 283 ("Buckley set the tone for jurisprudence of disclosure over the next three and a 
half decades."). 
51. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
52. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified 
at 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2002)), invalided in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
53. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3) (2006) defined an electioneering communica-
tion as an ad that "refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office," is broadcast within sixty 
days of a general or thirty days of a primary election, and, except in the case of presidential or vice 
presidential candidates, is targeted to the "relevant electorate." This meant that the category was 
expanded to include corporate ads that did not contain the Buckley "magic words," see supra note 46, 
but that did mention candidates by name in the immediate pre-election period. 
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But the Justices were nearly unanimous in upholding the parallel expansion 
of FECA's disclosure requirements. The new provisions required disclosure by 
individuals or entities that spent more than $10,000 per year funding "election-
eering communications," including the names and addresses of contributors 
over $1,000.54 The Court saw no constitutional infirmity with the extension of 
FECA's disclosure requirements beyond what the Court had approved in Buck-
ley, explaining that Buckley's express advocacy test was "an endpoint of 
statutory interpretation, not a first principle of constitutional law."55 The Court 
found that "the important state interests that prompted the Buckley Court to 
uphold FECA's disclosure requirements-providing the electorate with informa-
tion, deterring actual corruption and avoiding any appearance thereof, and 
gathering the data necessary to enforce more substantive electioneering restric-
tions-apply in full to [the disclosure requirements created by] BCRA."56 
In 2007, the Court, with new members Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Alito, considered afresh the constitutionality of BCRA's restriction on the use of 
corporate general-treasury funds for "electioneering communication[s]"57 in the 
immediate pre-election period. The case, FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. 
(WRTL /[), cast McConnell as only having upheld the restriction on corporate 
electioneering activity as facially constitutional, while leaving the door wide 
open to future as-applied challenges. 58 As to the as-applied challenge before it, 
the Court held that the ads Wisconsin Right to Life wished to broadcast, which 
exhorted viewers to contact Senators Herb Kohl and Russ Feingold and urge 
them to oppose the filibuster of judicial nominees, could not constitutionally be 
restricted. And the Court set forth a rule that an ad could be subject to BCRA's 
restriction "only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other 
than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate."59 
Although WRTL II did not address the expanded disclosure requirements 
the Court had upheld in McConnell, many feared that WRTL's retreat from 
McConnell's strong endorsement of the constitutionality of BCRA spelled 
54. BCRA § 201; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 195-96. 
55. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190. 
56. Id. at 196. This part of the opinion was jointly authored by Justices Stevens and O'Connor and 
joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice Scalia, joined the disclosure portion of this opinion (making it an opinion for eight Justices) 
with the comparatively minor exception of the provision requiring disclosure in advance of the actual 
expenditure of funds. See id. at 322 (Kennedy; J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). And Justice Scalia, who disagreed vehemently with the Stevens/O'Connor majority opinion, 
actually predicated much of his argument against the law's substantive restrictions on the notion that 
disclosure was sufficient to vindicate the important interests the law's defenders identified: "Evil 
corporate (and private affluent) influences are well enough checked (so long as adequate campaign-
expenditure disclosure rules exist) by the politician's fear of being portrayed as 'in the pocket' of 
so-called moneyed interests." Id. at 259 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). 
57. 2 U.S.C. § 44lb(b)(2) (2006). 
58. 551 U.S. 449,456 (2007). 
59. Id. at 451. 
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trouble for disclosure requirements.60 Against that backdrop, Citizens United 
appeared. 
2. Citizens United and Disclosure 
Citizens United v. FEC began as a case largely about disclosure.61 The 
organization behind Hillary: The Movie initiated the lawsuit that became Citizens 
United with the purpose of securing a judgment that BCRA's disclosure and 
disclaimer requirements were unconstitutional as applied to its film, a feature-
length critique of Hillary Clinton, 62 as well as to three short advertisements for 
the film. 63 It also argued that BCRA's prohibition on the use of corporate 
general-treasury funds for electioneering activity was unconstitutional both on 
its face and as applied to the film.64 A three-judge panel denied Citizens 
United's motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the FEC's motion for 
summary judgment on all counts.65 
The lower court first concluded that under McConnell, even as modified by 
WRTL II, the film was plainly electioneering, as it was susceptible to no other 
interpretation but that it was an appeal to vote against Hillary Clinton. 66 
Accordingly, the court found that the film fell squarely within BCRA's corpo-
rate expenditure prohibition,67 and there was thus no live question about the 
applicability of the law's disclosure and disclaimer requirements to the film. 
There was, however, a question as to whether the law's disclosure and 
disclaimer provisions were applicable to the short ads for the film. The dis-
closure provisions to which Citizens United objected, set forth in BCRA's 
§ 201, required any corporation that spent more than $10,000 on "electioneering 
communications"68 to file a report with the FEC detailing, among other things, 
the names and addresses of donors over $1,000.69 The disclaimer requirements 
in BCRA's § 311 also required any ad paid for by an entity other than a 
candidate or political committee to contain a simple disclaimer ("__ is 
60. See Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 3 (demonstrating that in the years immediately following . 
WRTL II, a number of lower courts read the logic of the decision as throwing into question or even 
invalidating state disclosure laws that resembled those contained in BCRA). 
61. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
62. See Amended Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Citizens United v. FEC, 
530 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2008) (per curiam) (No. 07-2240) 2007 WL 4774516. 
63. See id. at 16. 
64. See id. The FEC conceded that the advertisements were not subject to the prohibition, as they 
were not themselves electioneering activity, but merely proposed a commercial transaction. See 
Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 277 n.9 (D.D.C. 2008) (per curiam). 
65. See Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 282. 
66. See id. at 279-80. 
67. See id. at 280. 
68. Defined, once again, as an ad that "refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office," is 
broadcast within sixty days of a general or thirty days of a primary election, and, except in the case of 
presidential or vice presidential candidates, is targeted to the "relevant electorate." 2 U.S.C. § 434(£)(3) 
(2006). 
69. Id. § 434(£)(2). 
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responsible for the content of this advertising"), both spoken and displayed on 
the screen for at least four seconds. 70 In addition, § 311 required the sponsors of 
ads to include in the disclaimers "the name, address, and phone number or web 
address of the organization behind the advertisement."71 
Citizens United argued that because the ads themselves were not electioneer-
ing communications, Congress had no more power to require disclosure than it 
had to ban them outright.72 Put differently, Citizens United claimed that after 
WRTL II, only express advocacy, or its functional equivalent, could constitution-
ally be subject to any sort of regulation, including disclosure or disclaimer 
requirements. 
The three-judge court soundly rejected that argument, explaining that WRTL 
II had been limited to the question of the constitutionality of the outright ban on 
corporate electioneering activity. And the court noted, citing FEC v. Massachu-
setts Citizens for Life, Inc., 73 and several other decisions, that "in the past the 
Supreme Court has written approvingly of disclosure provisions triggered by 
political speech even though the speech itself was constitutionally protected 
under the First Amendment."74 
Citizens United appealed to the Supreme Court,75 challenging the lower 
court's rulings, first on the disclosure and disclaimer requirements, and second 
on the corporate electioneering ban.76 In its merits briefing, Citizens United 
relegated the disclosure and disclaimer arguments to decidedly secondary sta-
tus, 77 and the oral arguments similarly focused on the corporate electioneering 
prohibition. 78 
On June 29, 2009, rather than issuing an opinion in the case, the Court set the 
case for re-argument, asking the parties to brief the question whether Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce79 and the portion of McConnell upholding the 
70. 2 U.S.C. § 44ld(d)(l)(B) (2002). 
71. Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 280 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a)(3) (2002)). 
72. See id. 
73. 479 U.S . 238, 259-62 (1986). 
74. Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 281. 
75. The direct appeal was taken pursuant to BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 114 (2002) 
(codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437h (2002)) (requiring that "[a] final decision [on a constitutional challenge] 
shall be reviewable only by appeal directly to the Supreme Court of the United States"). 
76. Jurisdictional Statement, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08-205). Questions 
one and two challenged the lower court's ruling on the applicability of BCRA's disclosure require-
ments, while questions three and four focused on the corporate-electioneering prohibition. Id. 
77. See Brief for Appellant at 42-57, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08-205). 
78. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205). The 
Chief Justice did raise the question of disclosure near the end of Malcolm Stewart's argument for the 
government,' but their colloquy focused entirely on the likelihood that disclosure would subject donors 
to reprisal . See id. at 49-52. 
79. 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (upholding a Michigan statute that prohibited corporations from 
making independent expenditures in any state political campaigns, based on the state's interest in 
minimizing "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumu-
lated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for 
the corporation's political ideas"). 
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corporate electioneering prohibition should be overruled. 80 This refrarning meant 
that the question of disclosure largely dropped out of the case; the supplemental 
merits briefs engaged in no discussion of the question of disclosure, and the 
issue was similarly absent from nearly all of the arnicus briefs. 
As is now well-known, after re-argument, the Court, in a broad and sweeping 
opinion by Justice Kennedy, struck down BCRA's ban on corporate electioneer-
ing and express advocacy in the pre-election period.81 But in a critical and far 
less appreciated portion of the majority opinion, eight Justices-every member 
of the Court but Justice Thomas-also resoundingly upheld the constitutionality 
of BCRA's expanded disclosure and disclaimer requirements, in many ways 
giving a stronger seal of approval to disclosure than any of the Court's previous 
opinions. 
The Court began by affirming that under Buckley, disclosure requirements 
were subject to "exacting scrutiny," which required a '"substantial relation' 
between the disclosure requirement and a 'sufficiently important' governmental 
interest. "82 The Court explained that the Buckley Court deemed the govern-
ment's interest in providing voters with information "about the sources of 
election-related spending" sufficiently compelling to justify any First Amend-
ment encroachments represented by FECA's disclosure requirements.83 And, the 
Citizens United Court explained, McConnell affirmed the facial constitutionality 
of BCRA's disclosure and disclaimer requirements by reasoning that "they 
would help citizens 'make informed choices in the political marketplace. "'84 
The Citizens United Court found that the same rationale justified subjecting 
Citizens United's film and ads to the law's disclosure requirements.85 And, 
80. See Citizens United v. FEC, 557 U.S. 932 (2009) (mem.) (directing the parties to address the 
following question: "For the proper disposition of this case, should the Court overrule either or both 
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, and the part of McConnell v. Federal Election Comm 'n, 
which addresses the facial validity of Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002?" 
(citations omitted)). 
81. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S .. 310, 356, 361 (2010). In the same portion of the opinion, 
the Court dismissed the argument that the restriction on corporate speech should be upheld because 
corporations retained the ability to form PACs through which they could engage in electioneering 
activity, writing: 
[T]he option to form PACs does not alleviate the First Amendment problems with § 441b. 
PACs are burdensome alternatives; they are expensive to administer and subject to extensive 
regulations. For example, every PAC must appoint a treasurer, forward donations to the 
treasurer promptly, keep detailed records of the identities of the persons making donations, 
preserve receipts for three years, and file an organization statement and report changes to this 
information within 10 days. 
Id. at 337-38. 
82. Id. at 366---67 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam)). 
83. Id. at 367. 
84. Id. (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 197 (2003)). 
85 . Citizens United argued that the disclosure requirements, like the ban, should be limited to speech 
that was the functional equivalent of express advocacy-which would have excluded the ads, which 
were not themselves exhortations to vote for or against a particular candidate, but rather exhortations to 
purchase the film-and the Court rejected that argument. It found that the "public has an interest in 
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finding this "informational interest" plainly sufficient to justify the require-
ments, the Court concluded that it was unnecessary even "to consider the 
Government's other asserted interests"-limiting corruption and the appearance 
of corruption and enforcing the law's substantive lirnitations.86 
As to the disclaimer requirement, 87 the Court found that both the film and the 
ads in question fell within BCRA's definition of "electioneering communica-
tion."88 The Court found that the disclaimers provided viewers with useful 
· information-that a candidate or party, for example, did not fund the ads-and 
also information about the entities that were responsible for the speech. 89 
But the Court did more than merely reject Citizen United's challenge to 
disclosure and disclaimer requirements. It opined much more broadly on the 
question of whether Congress's power to prohibit certain types of speech, and 
its power to compel disclosure of information regarding that same sort of 
speech, were coterminous, finding that they were not: 
[D]isclosure is a less restrictive alternative to more comprehensive regulations 
of speech. In Buckley, the Court upheld a disclosure requirement for inde-
pendent expenditures even though it invalidated a provision that imposed a 
ceiling on those expenditures. In McConnell, three Justices who would have 
found § 441b to be unconstitutional nonetheless voted to uphold BCRA's 
disclosure and disclaimer requirements. And the Court has upheld registration 
and disclosure requirements on lobbyists, even though Congress has no power 
to ban lobbying itself. 90 
Finally, the Court addressed the possibility of shareholder part1c1pation, 
through corporate democracy mechanisms, in monitoring and checking corpo-
rate political activity: 
A campaign finance system that pairs corporate independent expenditures 
with effective disclosure has not existed before today .... With the advent of 
the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and 
citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and elected officials 
accountable for their positions and supporters. Shareholders can determine 
whether their corporation's political speech advances the corporation's inter-
est in making profits, and citizens can see whether elected officials are "in the 
pocket of so-called moneyed interests." The First Amendment protects politi-
cal speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to the 
knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly before an election," even if such speech is not 
tantamount to express advocacy. Id. at 369. 
86. Id. at 369. 
87. See 2 U.S.C. § 44ld(d)(2) (2006) 
88. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 368. 
89. See id. 
90. Id. at 369 (citations omitted). The Court did acknowledge, however, that compelled disclosure 
could in theory give rise to threats or harassment, and made clear that if the genuine probability of such 
events were established, the Court would be likely to sustain an as-applied challenge. Id. at 370. 
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speech of corporate entities in a proper way. This transparency enables the 
electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different 
speakers and messages. 91 
Although made in the context of shareholder participation, the Court's state-
ments about the promise and function of disclosure are not by their logic limited 
to the shareholder context; they appear to reveal, rather, the Court's broad 
conception of the functioning of campaign finance disclosure. 92 
Moreover, there is arguably a significant connection between the Court's two 
holdings, one that commentators have largely neglected: not only did the Court 
conclude that BCRA's disclosure requirements passed constitutional muster, but 
the existence and content of those requirements was arguably a critical com-
ponent of the Court's conclusion that the substantive limitation violated the 
First Amendment That is, when assessing the expenditure limitation, the Court 
did not dispute the legitimacy of the government's interest in preventing 
corruption or the appearance of corruption in campaigns for federal office; it 
simply appeared to conclude, in at least one portion of the opinion, that this 
interest was sufficiently advanced by mandated disclosure.93 
3. Disclosure in the Lower Courts in the Wake of Citizens United 
In the wake of their victory in Citizens United-and undeterred by the Court's 
apparent embrace of disclosure---0pponents of campaign finance regulation 
brought a slew of challenges to both federal and state disclosure requirements.94 
To date, the vast majority of those challenges have been unsuccessful, with 
most lower courts reading Citizens United as blessing the constitutionality of 
broad disclosure requirements. 95 
One of the most important post-Citizens United cases, SpeechNow.org v. 
FEC, is best known for striking down BCRA's contribution limits as applied to 
political committees that engage solely in independent expenditures (thereby 
giving rise to the "super-PAC").96 But the D.C. Circuit in SpeechNow.org also 
upheld the disclosure provisions that attached to contributions to, and expendi-
tures by, these newly empowered political committees. The court found that 
PAC disclosure requirements advanced both informational and enforcement 
91. Id. at 370 (citations omitted) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 259 (2003)). 
92. It is perhaps possible to read the Court's remarks about disclosure as simply explaining that the 
Constitution poses no obstacle to expansive disclosure requirements-as commentary on some hypotheti-
cal legal regime, rather than the one before it. But the Court's invocation of the "effective disclosure" 
in effect "today" strongly suggests that its discussion of disclosure was not an abstract one, but rather 
one grounded in its understanding of the current state of legally mandated disclosure. 
93. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369 ("[D]isclosure is a less restrictive alternative to more compre-
hensive regulations of speech."). And in McCutcheon v. FEC, the Court reiterated that "disclosure 
often represents a less restrictive alternative to flat bans on certain types or quantities of speech." 
134 S. Ct. 1434, 1460 (2014). 
94. See Michael Kang, Campaign Disclosure in Direct Democracy, 97 MINN. L. REv. 1700, 1700 
(2013) (" [C]ampaign disclosure laws now are under legal and political attack as never before."). 
95. See CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., supra note 4; see also Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 3, at l 084. 
96. 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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interests: "[T]he public has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a 
candidate and who is funding that speech .... Further, requiring disclosure of 
such information deters and helps expose violations of other campaign finance 
restrictions, such as those barring contributions from foreign corporations or 
individuals."97 
Other federal courts quickly followed suit, rejecting challenges to additional 
aspects of BCRA's disclosure requirements or the FEC's regulations imple-
menting those requirements. In June 2012, the Fourth Circuit rejected a 527 
organization's98 challenge to FEC regulations defining "expressly advocating"99 
for purposes of disclosure requirements. 100 And in March 2013, a Wyoming 
district court dismissed a similar challenge, finding that "disclaimer and disclo-
sure requirements become even more essential and necessary to enable in-
formed choice in the political marketplace following Citizens United's change 
to the political campaign landscape with the removal of the limit on corporate 
expenditures." 101 
Challenges to state disclosure requirements, in the context of both candidate 
elections and ballot initiatives and referenda, have for the most part fared 
similarly, with courts relying heavily, as did the Citizens United Court, on the 
informational interest i~ disclosure. For example, in 2011, the First Circuit 
rejected a broad challenge to provisions of Maine law requiring political com-
mittee registration and "disclosure and reporting of information about expendi-
tures made for election-related advocacy" 102 by non-PAC entities, and general 
attribution and disclaimer requirements for all "political advertisements and 
certain other political messages." 103 The court found those requirements justi-
fied by the state's interest in providing the electorate with information about the 
sources of political speech: 
In an age characterized by the rapid multiplication of media outlets and the 
rise of internet reporting, the "marketplace of ideas" has become flooded with 
a profusion of information and political messages. Citizens rely ever more on 
a message's source as a proxy for reliability and a barometer of political 
spin. 104 
97. Id. at 698. 
98. "527" refers to a tax-exempt political organization under 26 U.S.C. § 527 (2006). 
99. I I C.F.R. § 100.22 (2011). 
100. See Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. FEC, 681 F.3d 544, 558 (4th Cir. 2012). 
101. Free Speech v. FEC, No. 12-CV-127-S, at 14 (D. Wyo. Mar. 19, 2013), aff'd, 720 F.3d 788 
(10th Cir. 2013). But see Hispanic Leadership Fund, Inc. v. FEC, 897 F. Supp. 2d 407, 429-30 (E.D. 
Va. 2012) (concluding that proposed ads that included only audio clips of the President's voice or 
general references to "the White House" or "the government" were not electioneering communications 
and thus not subject to disclosure). 
102. Nat'I Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 201 l), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1635 
(Feb. 27, 2012); accord Nat'I Org. for Marriage v. Daluz, 654 F.3d 115, 116 (1st Cir. 2011) (upholding 
Rhode Island's similar disclosure requirements in a companion case to McKee). 
103. McKee, 649 F.3d at 43. 
104. Id. at 57. 
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In late 2012, the Seventh Circuit rejected a challenge to Illinois's disclosure 
requirements, which required both groups and individuals "that accept con-
tributions, make expenditures, or sponsor electioneering communications in 
excess of $3,000 to make regular financial disclosures to the State Board of 
Elections." 105 The court found that "[a]midst [a] cacophony of political voices-
super PACs, corporations, unions, advocacy groups, and individuals, not to 
mention the parties and candidates themselves--campaign finance data can help 
busy voters sift through the information and make informed political judg-
ments." 106 Also in 2012, a district court rebuffed a challenge to Vermont's 
disclosure laws, which applied to both PACs and to a lesser extent any other 
entity that engaged in electioneering communications. The court found that the 
laws bore "a substantial relation to Vermont's sufficiently important interest in 
permitting citizens to gauge the sources of candidate support." 107 In early 2013, 
the Fourth Circuit upheld a provision of West Virginia's campaign finance law 
requiring disclosure of expenditures over $5,000 on electioneering communica-
tions (and $1,000 during the immediate pre-election period). 108 And in mid-
2013, the Eleventh Circuit rejected a challenge to Florida's disclosure and 
disclaimer scheme that required registration as a political committee, with 
attendant disclosure and disclaimer requirements, by any group that wished to 
"accept contributions of--or spend-more than $500 in a year to expressly 
advocate the election or defeat of a candidate or the passage or defeat of a ballot 
issue."109 
105. Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 470 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Those disclosure reports included 
the total sums of contributions received and expenditures made in the covered period; 
accountings of the committee's funds on-hand and investment assets held; and the name and 
address of each contributor who gave more than $150 that quarter .... [in addition to] any 
contribution of $1,000 or more (along with the name and address of the contributor) within 
five days of its receipt, or within two days if received 30 or fewer days before an election. 
Id. at 472. 
106. Id. at 490. 
107. Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 875 F. Supp. 2d 376,400 (D. Vt. 2012). 
108. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom, Inc. v. Tennant, 706 F.3d 270, 290-92 (4th Cir. 2013). 
109. Worley v. Fla. Sec'y of State, 717 F.3d 1238, 1240 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing FLA. STAT. 
§ 106.01 l(l)(a) (2012)). Courts have also upheld laws requiring disclosure in the ballot-initiative 
context, also primarily relying on the informational interest. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has 
rejected several challenges to Washington's disclosure rules by groups that spend money supporting or 
opposing ballot measures. See Family PAC v. McKenna, 685 F.3d 800, 803, 808 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(upholding Washington provisions requiring disclosure of "the name and address of contributors giving 
more than $25 [as well as] the employer and occupation of contributors giving more than $100," to 
political committees formed to support or oppose ballot measures, and explaining that "[d]isclo-
sure ... gives voters insight into the actual policy ramifications of a ballot measure," and that "by 
knowing who backs or opposes a given initiative, voters will have a pretty good idea of who stands to 
benefit from the legislation" (internal quotation mark omitted)); Human Life of Wash. Inc. v. Brum-
sickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1008 (9th •Cir. 2010) (rejecting a broad challenge to Washington's disclosure 
requirements, both facially and as applied to a group's ballot-measure efforts, and explaining that 
disclosure can "provid[e] the voting public with the information with which to assess the various 
messages vying for their attention in the marketplace of ideas"). 
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Not all state disclosure laws have survived post-Citizens United scrutiny. In 
2012, the Eighth Circuit concluded that a Minnesota state-law requirement 
that corporations and other associations making independent expenditures over 
$100 do so through a PAC-like entity termed a "political fund"-with ongoing 
reporting requirements even in periods of inactivity-likely exceeded the bounds 
of what the Supreme Court had approved in Citizens United. 110 In 2013, that 
same court invalidated several aspects of a similar Iowa law imposing disclo-
sure and ongoing reporting requirements on independent spenders. 111 Similarly, 
the Tenth Circuit has invalidated two state-law disclosure requirements as 
applied to small nonprofit or neighborhood groups. 112 Still, even with these 
narrow victories for opponents of disclosure, as a general matter, both state and 
federal disclosure laws appear at the moment to be on firm legal footing. 1I3 
C. THE FEC AND DISCLOSURE IN 2014 
The preceding sections examined the basic jurisprudence of disclosure. But 
the practice of disclosure in 2014 is informed, to a perhaps even greater degree, 
by the interpretation and enforcement of the law of disclosure by the FEC. This 
is particularly true over the last decade, as the FEC has attempted to respond, 
through enforcement and rulemaking, to the Court's shifting interpretation of 
110. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 877 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(en bane). 
111. See Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576, 596-601(8th Cir. 2013). 
112. See Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247, 1249 (10th Cir. 2010) (invalidating Colorado 
campaign finance disclosure requirements as applied to a neighborhood group that had raised less than 
$1 ,000); N.M. Youth Organized v. Herrera, 611 F.3d 669, 671 (10th Cir. 2010) (invalidating New 
Mexico disclosure requirements as applied to two nonprofit organizations "formed for the purpose of 
educating young New Mexicans about issues such as healthcare, clean elections, the economy and the 
environment"). 
113. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself rejected a challenge to state-mandated disclosure in a related 
context just a few months after its decision in Citizens United (albeit in a case that differs in some 
significant respects from the state-disclosure cases detailed above). See Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 130 
S. Ct. 2811, 2821 (2010). Reed involved a First Amendment challenge to a state open-records law that 
granted requesters access, among other things, to submitted referendum petitions, which included the 
names and addresses of petition signatories. See id. at 2815. The Court rejected the challenge, finding 
the state's interest in "preserving the integrity of the electoral process" sufficiently compelling to defeat 
the petitioners' constitutional challenge, so that it did not even need to address the state's proffered 
"informational interest"-that is, its interest in "providing information to the electorate about who 
supports the petition." Id. at 2819. And the Court reiterated its approval of disclosure requirements in 
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1459-{i0 (2014) ("[D]isclosure of contributions minimizes the 
potential for abuse of the campaign finance system .... [D]isclosure . . . offers a particularly effective 
means of arming the voting public with information."). 
Despite the Court's endorsements of the constitutionality of disclosure in Citizens United, Doe, 
and most recently Mccutcheon, a spate of recent scholarship suggests that certain types of manda-
tory disclosure may pose a serious threat to contributor privacy interests. See Rebecca Green, Petitions, 
Privacy, and Political Obscurity, 85 TEMP. L. REv. 367, 367 (2013); William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre's 
Persona: Bringing Privacy Theory to Election Law, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 859, 861 (2011); 
Bruce Cain, Shade from the Glare: The Case for Semi-Disclosure, in FOLLOWING THE MONEY: THE LAW 
AND ETHICS OP CAMPAIGN FINANCE DISCLOSURE (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.cato-unbound.org/print-issue/ 
457. But see Hasen, supra note 3, at 572-73 (2012) (critiquing privacy concerns about disclosure). 
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BCRA's provisions. 
As discussed above, in 2002 BCRA expanded FECA's disclosure require-
ments so that they were triggered not just by express advocacy, but also by 
any "electioneering communications," a broader category of campaign-related 
speech. 114 BCRA's expanded disclosure provisions applied to any individual or 
entity that spent more than $10,000 per year on electioneering communications-
not just political committees-and the statute required the identification of all 
contributors over $1,000 since the start of the preceding calendar year. 115 In 
2007, after the Supreme Court held in WRTL II that BCRA's prohibition on 
corporate electioneering activity only applied to activity that was the "func-
tional equivalent" of express advocacy, 116 the FEC relied on rulemaking to 
implement the Court's new definition of electioneering. Although the WRTL II 
Court had taken no position on BCRA's disclosure requirements, the FEC opted 
nonetheless to address disclosure in its rulemaking. BCRA's text required 
disclosure statements to contain the "names and addresses of all contributors 
who contributed an aggregate amount of $1,000," 117 but the regulation ulti-
mately promulgated by the FEC required the disclosure of the identities of 
contributors over $1,000 only if such contributions were made "for the purpose 
of furthering electioneering communications."118 
A key test of that regulation came in 2010 and involved Freedom's Watch, a 
group that had spent $126,000 on electioneering ads in the 2008 election cycle. 
The group filed reports with the FEC documenting its spending, but did not 
provide the identities of contributors to the organization, claiming that "all the 
donations had been given to support the organization's general purposes, and 
none were earmarked for specific electioneering ads," so that "they were not 
subject to the statutory disclosure requirement." 119 An outside group filed a 
complaint with the FEC, alleging that Freedom's Watch had failed to make the 
disclosures required by the FEC regulation. 120 The FEC divided over the issue 
3-2 and accordingly dismissed the complaint, an action technically without 
precedential value. 121 But the effect of the episode has been that groups en-
114. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
115. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(2) (2002). 
116. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTLI[), 551 U.S. 449,451 (2007). 
117. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(2)(E), (F) (2002). 
118. 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9) (2012). As the FEC explained in its rulemaking, the new standard 
would require disclosure only of "the identities of those persons who made a donation aggregating 
$1,000 or more specifically for the purpose of furthering [electioneering communications] ." Electioneer-
ing Communications, 72 Fed. Reg. 72,899, 72,911 (Dec. 26, 2007); see also 11 C.F.R. § 109.20 (2012); 
Potter & Morgan, supra note 19, at 425-28 (discussing history of regulation). 
119. Briffault, Updating Disclosure, supra note 3, at 697. 
120. The complaint alleged that Freedom's Watch "Failed to Disclose Donations Made for the 
Purpose of Furthering Electioneering Communications." Complaint against Freedom's Watch Inc., 
Freedom's Watch, Inc. (FEC Apr. 23, 2008) (matter under review), available at http://eqs.fec.gov/ 
eqsdocsMUR/ I 0044272034. pdf. 
121. See Statement of Reasons of Chairman Matthew S. Petersen and Commissioners Caroline C. 
Hunter and Donald F. McGahn, Freedom's Watch, Inc. (FEC Aug. 13, 2010) (complaint dismissed and 
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gaging in outside spending in its wake have invariably opted not to make any 
contributor disclosure, "except in the unlikely event that a donor earmarks his 
contribution for a specific election campaign."122 
After Citizens United cleared the way for unlimited spending by corporations, 
but also approved the law's broad disclosure requirements, Representative Chris 
Van Hollen challenged this FEC regulation, arguing that the FEC's limitation of 
disclosure to contributions "made for the purpose of furthering electioneering 
communications" was unduly narrow in light of BCRA's clear intent to extend 
disclosure requirements to "all contributors."123 The district court agreed with 
Van Hollen, 124 and the FEC declined to appeal to the D.C. Circuit. 125 But 
several interveners did appeal, and the D.C. Circuit reversed. 126 The case is 
again pending before the district court. 127 
II. EXAMINING DISCLOSURE: GOVERNMENT INTERESTS AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
As detailed above, 128 the Supreme Court has identified three primary justifi-
cations for campaign finance disclosure requirements: supplying voters with 
sufficient information to enable them to appropriately evaluate campaign speech 
(the "informational interest"); preventing corruption and the appearance of 
corruption (the "anticorruption interest"); and aiding in the enforcement of other 
campaign finance regulations (the "enforcement interest"). The Citizens United 
Court concluded that BCRA's disclosure and disclaimer requirements were 
justified by the informational interest alone, so it declined even to consider the 
file closed), available at http://www.fec.gov/press/press2010/20100608MUR.shtml; Statement of Rea-
sons of Vice Chair Cynthia L. Bauerly and Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub, Freedom's Watch, Inc., 
(FEC Sept. 16, 2010) (dissenting commissioners), available at http://www.fec.gov/members/weintraub/ 
murs/mur6002sor. pdf. 
122. Briffault, Updating Disclosure, supra note 3, at 697. A recent article explains that the rise of 
undisclosed outside spending of precisely this sort 
is best understood as primarily a failure of the Federal Election Commission (FEC) .. .. This 
is because the plain statutory language of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), 
and subsequent amendments to FECA, including McCain-Feingold, is sufficiently broad to 
provide for full disclosure of the sources of the vast majority of funds used to influence federal 
elections . . . . But . .. the FEC has implemented and applied the disclosure provisions .. . in 
an extraordinarily narrow and illogical manner that effectively renders the statutory disclosure 
requirements meaningless. 
Potter & Morgan, supra note 19, at 387. 
123. Van Hollen v. FEC, 851 F. Supp. 2d 69, 75~76 (D.D.C. 2012) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
124. See id. at 89. 
125. See Notice of Defendant Federal Election Commission, Van Hollen v. FEC, 851 F. Supp. 2d 69 
(2012) (No. 11-0766) ("The Federal Election Commission hereby advises that it will not appeal the 
Court's orderofMarch 30, 2012 (Doc. No. 49)."). 
126. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Van Hollen, 694 F.3d I 08, 112 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
127. A motion hearing was held on October 29, 2013. See Docket, Van Hollen v. FEC, 11 -766 
(D.D.C. Oct. 29, 2013). 
128. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text. 
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other interests the Court has identified. 129 For that reason, while we discuss 
each of the interests in tum below, we focus in the next section on empirical 
investigations of the informational interest. 
A. THE SUPREME COURT'S ARTICULATED INTERESTS 
1. The Informational Interest 
Beginning in Buckley, the Supreme Court has recognized an important in-
formational interest in disclosure. 130 According to the Court, the content of 
disclosure may aid the electorate by informing an analysis of candidate posi-
tions that goes beyond explicit party labels and campaign speeches. 131 This 
analysis may be aided by disclosure in two ways. For one, disclosure may serve 
as a public endorsement-especially disclosure in the form of disclaimers that 
accompany political advertisements-of the groups or individuals supporting a 
candidate. For another, disclosure-especially disclosure in the form of large-
scale databases that we investigate here-may "reveal whose interests a candi-
date will be inclined to serve once elected-whatever the candidate's own 
substantive views." 132 The second of these two may be broadly conceived of as 
an accountability interest-by providing information about the interests to 
whom elected officials may in theory be beholden, disclosure empowers the 
electorate to monitor the conduct of elected officials to discern whether their 
behavior while in office reflects the interests of their donors, rather than the 
interests of their constituents. 133 
Yet another strain of the informational interest, closely related to the account-
ability interest, has been described by commentators as a sort of general public 
interest in disclosure. Disclosure "permits the study of the influence of money 
on policymaking, and may thereby lead to a greater understanding of the 
workings of a political system." 134 As Richard Briffault frames it, "[e]ven if 
campaign finance disclosure has a limited direct effect on voters' decisions, it 
can still play an important salutary role in informing the public generally about 
the powerful economic forces that shape our elections, our politics, and ulti-
mately, our public policy." 135 
129. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 369-70 (2010). But see McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 
1434, 1460 (2014) ("Today, given the Internet, disclosure offers ... robust protections against corrup-
tion."). 
130. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 67 (1976). 
131. As the Court explained in Buckley, disclosure "allows voters to place each candidate in the 
political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign 
speeches." Id. 
132. Daniel R. Ortiz, The Informational Interest, 27 J.L. & PoL. 663,676 (2012). 
133. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370-71 (noting that through disclosure, "citizens can see 
whether elected officials are in the pocket of so-called moneyed interests" and can "make informed 
decisions" based on such information (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
134. Clyde Wilcox, Designing Campaign Finance Disclosure in the States: Tracing the Tributaries 
of Campaign Finance, 4 ELECTION L.J. 371,374 (2005). 
135. Briffault, Updating Disclosure, supra note 3, at 718. 
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2. The Anticorruption Interest 
Since even before Buckley, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the 
government's interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption 
justifies campaign finance disclosure requirements. 136 The precise meaning of 
this anticorruption interest, however, has shifted over time.137 The Court's early 
cases slide between different conceptions of "corruption," at times focusing on 
more traditional "quid pro quo" corruption, 138 at other times expanding that 
noti~n to include the very appearance of corruption, 139 and at still other times 
taking a much more expansive view of corruption as "a distortion of political 
outcomes as a result of the undue influence of wealth." 140 
Of these competing visions of corruption, it is clear that the only one that 
136. See Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 548 (1934) ("[P]ublic disclosure of political 
contributions, together with the names of contributors and other details, would tend to prevent the 
corrupt use of money to affect elections."). Indeed, the anticorruption interest was once the key 
justification the Court identified for such requirements. See Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure, 
supra note I 8, at 281 (noting that it was not until Buckley that "the crucial argument for disclosure 
shifted [from the anticorruption interest to] ... voter information"). For a detailed originalist argument 
that the Framers' concern with corruption was so great that they enshrined within the Constitution a 
free-standing anticorruption principle, see Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 COR-
NELL L. REv. 341, 342 (2009) (arguing that Buckley "gave corruption a relatively weak role in the 
constitutional scheme" so that the "concept of corruption has been unbound from the text and history of 
the document itself'). 
137. See Nathaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Finance: 
When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 119, 122 (2004) (noting, in 
the Court's campaign finance cases, the "alternating tendencies of the word 'corruption' to mean 
everything and nothing"). 
138. Much of the language in Buckley seems to take this narrow view of corruption. Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976) ("To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political 
quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative 
democracy is undermined."); see also McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1466 (2014) ("Congress 
may target only a specific type of corruption-quid pro quo corruption." (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
139. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 ("Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo 
arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the 
opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions."); Nixon v. 
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 395 (2000) ("[T]here is little reason to doubt that sometimes 
large contributions will work actual corruption of our political system, and no reason to question the 
existence of a corresponding suspicion among voters."). 
140. Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REv. 118, 121-22 (2010) (arguing 
that until Citizens United, the Court "struggled between two competing views of the sources of 
potential corruption as a result of campaign finance": actual quid pro quo arrangements, on the one 
hand, and the distorting effects of money on the political process, on the other). Political scientist 
Thomas Burke discerns three different strains, rather than two, in the Court's cases: "quid pro quo, 
monetary influence, and distortion." Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign 
Finance Law, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 127, 131 (1997). Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 
652, 660 (1990), involves the most explicit articulation of the distortion/monetary influence vision of 
corruption, when it describes the "corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth 
that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form," but it can be found in other cases as well. 
See, e.g., Nixon, 528 U.S. at 389 (articulating, in addition to the appearance of corruption rationale, "a 
concern not confined to bribery of public officials, but extending to the broader threat from politicians 
too compliant with the wishes of large contributors"); FEC v. Nat'! Conservative Political Action 
Comm.,470 U.S. 480,497 (1985) ("Corruption is a subversion of the political process. Elected officials 
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survives Citizens United as to substantive campaign finance limitations is 
quid pro quo corruption. As Justice Kennedy wrote in his discussion of the 
corporate electioneering ban, "[ w ]hen Buckley identified a sufficiently important 
governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, 
that interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption." 141 Citizens United went on 
to hold that independent expenditures were categorically incapable of giving 
rise to quid pro quo corruption.142 
So post-Citizens United, it is clear that the additiorial variants of corruption 
the Court has identified can no longer justify campaign finance regulations like 
expenditure restrictions. But it does not necessarily follow that the Court's 
narrowing of the idea of corruption in the context of substantive limitations 
applies with full force to disclosure requirements. 143 On the one hand, it may be 
that the Court's newly limited conception of the anticorruption interest similarly 
drains the interest of much or all of its force when it comes to disclosure 
requirements (for it is difficult to conceive of a disclosure requirement that 
could withstand scrutiny if justified merely by an interest in preventing 
quid pro quo corruption, at least in the context of independent expenditures).144 
On the other hand, justifications for disclosure requirements have always been 
somewhat distinct from justifications for substantive limitations. There is 
accordingly a strong argument that the "antidistortion" or "monetary influence" 
strains of the anticorruption interest may have some continued applicability to 
disclosure. 
Indeed, Citizen United's insistence that government may require disclosure 
even of speech it could not proscribe outright implies some additional justifica-
tions for disclosure beyond those that are applicable in the context of other 
substantive campaign finance limitations. There is, of course, the informational 
interest described above, but there may also remain an anticorruption residuum 
beyond just quid pro quo corruption in the context of disclosure. 
In a post-Citizens United article, Samuel Issacharoff tackles the question of 
are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to 
themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns."). 
141. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010) (emphasis added). Justice Kennedy also 
referred to Austin's antidistortion rationale as an "aberration." Id. at 355. 
142. Id. at 360 (stating that "independent expenditures do not lead to, or create the appearance of, 
quid pro quo corruption"). 
143. But cf Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. I, 4 (2012) 
("This narrowing of what counts as corruption for purposes of campaign finance law constrains not 
only the regulation of corporate spending but all types of campaign finance spending."). 
144. At least one circuit court has so concluded: 
The second interest-preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption--does not apply 
to the case at hand because "electioneering communication" does not include activity by 
candidates or their committees .. . . [A]nd the Supreme Court has held that third-party expendi-
tures "do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption." 
Ctr. for Individual Freedom, Inc. v. Tennant, 706 F.3d 270, 282 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Citizens 
United, 558 U.S. at 314). 
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what exactly we mean by corruption in the context of campaign finance. 145 He 
agrees that the Court's cases have traditionally framed corruption as either 
traditional "quid pro quo" corruption or its appearance (the majority position), 
or distortion/monetary-influence corruption (generally embraced by the dissent-
ers in the Court's campaign finance cases). 146 But Issacharoff proposes an 
alternative understanding of corruption, one that involves a temporal shift-
away from campaigns and elections, and towards the governing activities in 
which those who emerge victorious from campaigns engage-and a shift in 
focus from inputs to policy outputs. He writes: 
[T]he underlying problem is not so much what happens in the electoral arena 
but what incentives are offered to elected officials while in office .... [T]he 
inquiry on officeholding asks whether the electoral system leads the political 
class to offer private gain from public action to distinct, tightly organized 
constituencies, which in tum may be mobilized to keep compliant public 
officials in office. 147 
Michael Kang argues for a similar reorientation in our conception of the 
anti corruption interest when he suggests that "[ c ]ampaign finance reform must 
shift to ex post measures to limit the influence of campaign money once it is 
already in the system, as opposed to ex ante regulation." 148 In making this 
argument, Kang relies heavily on the Court's decision in Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., 149 decided the year before Citizens United. 150 The Caperton 
Court concluded that the Constitution required a West Virginia Supreme Court 
justice to recuse himself from a case involving a supporter who had made 
$3 million in independent expenditures on the justice's election campaign. 151 
The Citizens United Court attempted to reconcile its holding with Caperton by 
explaining that "Caperton's holding was limited to the rule that the judge must 
be recused, not that the litigant's political speech could be banned."152 But 
Kang reads the interaction of the two cases as signaling "that the Court actually 
may be sympathetic to concerns about campaign finance corruption, even from 
145. See generally Issacharoff, supra note 140. 
146. Id. at 122. 
147. Id. at 126. Dennis Thompson makes essentially the opposite argument. He divides "corruption" 
into two categories: "governmental corruption," "in which an official provides a governmental benefit 
or service in return for a payment or favor from a private citizen," and "electoral corruption," which 
"refers to the integrity of the elections and the campaigns that lead up to them." Dennis F. Thompson, 
Two Concepts of Corruption: Making Campaigns Safe for Democracy, 73 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1036, 
1036-37 (2005). Thompson argues for renewed attention to electoral integrity, in part by shifting our 
attention from the impact of money and other sorts of political currencies on politicians to their impact 
on voters. See id. at 1037-38. 
148. Kang, supra note 143, at 52-53. 
149. 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
150. See Kang, supra note 143, at 52-53. 
151. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 886-87. 
152. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310,360 (2010). 
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independent expenditures, but only when the responsive regulation is structured 
to cabin the effects of campaign money ex post, rather than restrict the entry of 
campaign money ex ante." 153 
Although neither Issacharoff nor Kang focuses on the interaction of their 
conceptions of corruption with disclosure, 154 robust disclosure must be a critical 
component of their reconceptualized anticorruption interests. 155 For disclosure 
is the only mechanism by which it might be possible to track, over time, 
whether campaign contributors are in fact able to exact from politicians private 
gains (rather than public goods) through the sorts of clientelist relationships that 
Issacharoff identifies156-a variant on what Lawrence Lessig terms "depen-
dence corruption."157 In fact, the conceptions of corruption Issacharoff and 
Kang identify as surviving Citizens United must be predicated on robust and 
effective disclosure mechanisms; those mechanisms, in one form or another, are 
the only way ex post accountability can be achieved. 
3. The Enforcement Interest 
The Court has also identified disclosure as a mechanism by which the 
government can police compliance with other campaign finance laws, although 
there is a degree of imprecision in the Court's description of this interest. 
Richard Briffault argues that the Court has largely conflated reporting and 
disclosure in its identification of this interest. 158 Briffault points out that with 
good reporting, the FEC (or any similar body) could police compliance with 
other campaign finance laws. Accordingly, he contends, public scrutiny is not in 
fact necessary to advance this interest. 159 
This argument is correct in theory but flawed in practice because of the way 
the FEC actually enforces the substantive laws within its jurisdiction-through 
public complaints (but not anonymous ones), 160 and by internally generated 
review only in cases where an initial review has revealed cause for further 
153. Kang, supra note 143, at 57. 
154. Kang has elsewhere suggested that the governmental interest in disclosure can more produc-
tively be conceived of as an interest in promoting "voter competence," rather than in preventing 
corruption (at least in the context of direct democracy). See generally Michael S. Kang, Democratizing 
Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and "Disclosure Plus," 50 
UCLA L. REY. 1141 (2003). 
155. Although Issacharoff does not discuss disclosure as such in the piece cited above, in an earlier 
essay with Pam Karlan, he makes clear that he favors requiring "immediate internet disclosure of all 
campaign contributions to individuals, parties, or political action committees." Samuel lssacharoff & 
Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REv. 1705, 1736 (1999). 
156. See Issacharoff, supra note 140, at 138-42. 
157. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, Losr. How MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS-AND A PLAN ro STOP IT 
15-20 (2011). 
158. See Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure, supra note 18, at 280-81. 
159. See id. 
160. In the 1976 amendments to FECA, Congress "denied the Commission authority to investigate 
anonymous complaints." Lauren Eber, Note, Waiting for Watergate: The Long Road to FEC Reform, 
79 S. CAL. L. REv. 1155, 1167 (2006); BROOKS JACKSON, BROKEN PROMISE: WHY THE FEDERAL ELECTION 
COMMISSION FAILED 29-30 (1990). 
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investigation. 161 Although the FEC was originally empowered to conduct ran-
dom audits, Congress revoked that authority in 1979. 162 The FEC's "goal" is 
now to conduct forty to fifty "audits for cause" each election cycle. 163 In the 
absence of FEC authority to conduct meaningful, in-depth audits to ensure 
compliance absent public complaint or other preexisting noncompliance, public 
dissemination of campaign finance information remains central to the enforce-
ment of other campaign finance laws. 
There is no question that as the Court invalidates substantive components of 
the campaign finance regime, the enforcement interest in disclosure is conse-
quently weakened.164 But as long as federal law continues to impose some 
limits on money in elections, at least on the contributions side, 165 the enforce-
ment interest will remain a viable government purpose under current doctrine. 
Indeed, post-Citizens United lower courts have continued to credit the enforce-
ment interest as a significant justification for disclosure requirements. 166 
B. ASSESSING DISCLOSURE 
1. Estimating the Effects of Disclosure 
In Citizens United, the Court made broad and largely unsupported as-
sumptions about the effects of disclosure on voters, reasoning that it "enable[ d] 
the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different 
speakers and messages." 167 But whether disclosure does, in fact, aid voters' 
decision-making processes--or has other salutary effects on society more 
broadly-is an empirical question, and one that a number of studies have 
attempted to test. Taken together, those studies show that disclosure can assist 
voters in reaching informed decisions-but only under certain conditions and in 
certain forms. 
Social scientists have long known that the electorate is not particularly well 
informed, and may even be considerably misinformed. 168 Indeed, "four decades 
161. See GREG Scorr & GARY MULLEN, FEC, THIRTY YEAR REPORT 12 (2005), http://www.fec.gov/info/ 
publications/30year.pdf. 
162. See JACKSON, supra note 160, at 30. 
163. FEC, OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE OVERVIEW-ENFORCEMENT HEARING 7 (2009), available at http:// 
www.fec.gov/em/enfpro/complistatsfy05-08.pdf. 
164. See, e.g., Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 744 (2008) (invalidating BCRA's "millionaire's amend-
ment" and further holding that the amendment's heightened disclosure requirements, which were 
"designed to implement the asymmetrical contribution limits," must similarly fall) . 
165. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 441e (banning contributions by foreign nationals and foreign corpora-
tions) ; id.§ 441b (banning corporate contributions). 
166. See, e.g., SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating that "requiring 
disclosure ... deters and helps expose violations of other campaign finance restrictions"). 
167. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010). The Court reiterated these basic ideas in 
McCutcheon v. FEC, when it wrote that "[w]ith modern technology, disclosure now offers a particularly 
effective means of arming the voting public with information." 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1460 (2014). 
168. See, e.g., James H. Kuklinski et al., The Political Environment and Citizen Competence, 
45 AM. J. PoL. Sci. 410,410 (2001); Jeremy N. Sheff, The Myth of the Level Playing Field: Knowledge, 
Affect, and Repetition in Public Debate, 75 Mo. L REv. 143, 151 (2010). 
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of survey research show that citizens cannot recall basic political facts ... , do 
not have a consistent understanding of ideological abstractions ... , and fail to 
recall or recognize the names of their elected representatives."169 For instance, a 
recent Pew Research survey found that just 40% of voters knew which political 
party controlled the House of Representatives, and only 39% could correctly 
identify the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 170 
However, "there are specific conditions under which people who have limited 
information can make reasoned choices."171 Political psychologists have theo-
rized that voters' decisions often hinge on cognitive shortcuts, or "heuristics," 
which act as proxies for underlying policy positions or preferences. Heuristics 
enable citizens to make decisions with limited information, and indeed to make 
decisions more efficiently, given competing demands for time and attention. 172 
For voters, one well-known heuristic that routinely aids candidate choice is 
political party-voters frequently select candidates based purely on their parti-
san affiliation without a deep understanding of a candidate's particular issue 
stances, voting history, or relevant political experience. 173 These dynamics also 
"justify voter decisions to attend to a candidate's ... work experience, involve-
ment in scandals (if any), sound bites (e.g., tough on crime, .tax cutter), interest 
group ratings, endorsements (e.g., supported by labor), or personal appearance 
instead of learning a candidate's complete legislative voting history, policy 
169. Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Institutional Foundations of Political Compe-
tence: How Citizens Learn What They Need to Know, in ELEMENTS OF REASON: COGNITION, CHOICE, AND 
THE BOUNDS OF RATIONALITY 47, 50 (Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins & Samuel L. Popkin eds., 
2000); accord Paul Freedman, Michael Franz & Kenneth Goldstein, Campaign Advertising and 
Democratic Citizenship, 48 AM J. POL. Sc1. 723, 724 (2004) (summarizing a "half century" of research 
and concluding that "when it comes to politics and political information, most Americans are severely 
malnourished," that they "are inattentive to most things political; [they] care little, know less, and 
participate in politics only when absolutely necessary," and that their "political views are peripatetic, 
_hastily assembled, unconstrained by ideology, and unencumbered by data"). 
170. PEw REsEARCH CTR., WH!J VOTERS KNow ABOUT CAMPAIGN 2012, http://www.people-press.org/ 
files/2012/08/8-10-12-Knowledge-release.pdf. 
171. ARTHUR LUPIA & MIJHEW MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRIJIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT 
THEY NEED ro KNow? 5 (1998). 
172. See Delia Baldassarri & Hans Schadee, Voter Heuristics and Political Cognition in Italy: An 
Empirical Typology, 25 ELECTORAL STUD. 448, 450 (2006) (noting that when confronted with complex, 
risky and uncertain situations, decision makers use heuristics to make satisfactory decisions); Elizabeth 
Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign Disclosure Laws in Direct Democ-
racy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295, 296 (2005) ("No voter needs to acquire all available information to 
competently make a reasoned decision. Instead, she can rely on particular pieces of information, 
connected non-accidentally to accurate conclusions about the consequences of her vote, and still vote 
competently."); Gerd Gigerenzer & Wolfgang Gaissmaier, Heuristic Decision Making, 62 ANN. REv. 
PsYCHOL. 451, 473 (2011) ("[H]euristics can often be more accurate than complex 'rational' strate-
gies."); Arthur Lupia & John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy: New Approaches to Old Questions, 
7 ANN. REv. POL. Sc1. 463,468 (2004) (reporting that human nature demands that decisions be based on 
heuristics because one cannot know detailed information or conduct rigorous research on every choice, 
even complex and important ones). 
173. See generally ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER (1960); SAMUELL. POPKIN, THE 
REASONING VOTER: CoMMUNICIJION AND PERSUASION IN PREsIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS (1991); James H. Kuklinski 
& Paul J. Quirk, Conceptual Foundations of Citizen Competence, 23 PoL. BEHAV. 285 (2001). 
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portfolio, or name." 174 Although these simplified cues are imperfect, the use of 
heuristics may help close informational deficits for less informed voters, result-
ing in a mass electorate that, on average, approximates one where decision 
makers are well, or at least better, informed. 175 
In a convincing empirical demonstration of the power of heuristics in voter 
decision making, Arthur Lupia compares the voting behavior of poorly in-
formed and well-informed voters on an auto-insurance ballot initiative in Califor-
nia.176 The ballot initiative pitted three interest groups-the insurance industry, 
trial lawyers, and consumer groups-against each other and spawned five 
distinct propositions regarding auto-insurance forms. 177 Despite small sample 
sizes, the results demonstrate that voters' ability to identify the interest group 
backing a particular proposal enabled poorly informed voters to mirror the 
decision-making processes of their more well-informed peers. 178 Lupia con-
cludes that these signals may effectively substitute for more fine-grained, 
"encyclopedic" forms of knowledge about policy proposals and should inform 
proposals to "educate" the public on matters of politics. 179 
A recent experimental study by political scientist Michael Sances gives 
strong support to the hypothesis that disclosures about political money "serve[] 
as ... useful signal[ s] to voters regarding candidates' ideology." 180 Participants 
in Sances's study were shown an edited political advertisement supporting a 
Senate candidate during the 2010 campaign cycle; the advertisement did not 
identify the candidate's party and merely "emphasized the non-partisan issue of 
'job creation. " ' 181 Some participants were then shown a disclaimer indicating 
that a fictional organization, "Americans for Change," was responsible for the 
174. LUPIA& McCUBBINS, supra note 171, at 30. 
175. The theory that heuristics significantly aid the decision-making processes of voters has not been 
without critics. See Larry M. Bartels, Uninformed Votes: Information Effects in Presidential Elections, 
40 AM. J. PoL. Sc1. 194, 217 (1996) (describing the difference in the vote choices of hypothetical "fully 
informed" voters and uninformed voters, and finding that, with cues and shortcuts, the uninformed "do 
significantly better than they would by chance, but significantly less well than they would with 
complete information"); Richard R. Lau & David P. Redlawsk, Advantages and Disadvantages of 
Cognitive Heuristics in Political Decision Making, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 951, 964 (2001) (demonstrating 
that sophisticated voters are the most likely to benefit from informational shortcuts-including interest 
group endorsements-while heavy heuristic use may actually disadvantage less informed voters); 
David M . Primo, Information at the Margin: Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws, Ballot Issues, and 
Voter Knowledge, 12 ELECTION L.J. 114, 126--27 (2013) (finding that campaign finance information 
embedded in mock newspaper articles has no statistically significant effect on voters' ability to identify 
interest groups' positions on a ballot issue at the margin, that is after controlling for other types of 
information available to voters). 
176. See Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in Califor-
nia Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. Sc1. REv. 63 (1994). 
177. See id. at 64. 
178. See id. at 72. 
179. Id. 
180. Michael W. Sances, ls Money in Politics Harming Trust in Government? Evidence from Two 
Survey Experiments, 12 ELECTION L.J. 53, 54 (2013). 
181. Id. at 56. 
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advertisement. 182 Two groups were also shown text that purported to list the 
top contributors to "Americans for Change": the "Labor Disclosure" group was 
shown a list of five labor unions, and the "Business Disclosure'. ' group was 
shown a list of five corporations ( chosen from the contributors to the American 
Crossroads PAC). 183 Participants, who had supplied their partisan identification 
at the outset of the study, were then asked how likely they were to vote for the 
candidate depicted in the advertisement. Compared to subjects who were not 
provided disclosures listing the top contributors to the fictional organization, 
Republican subjects were significantly less likely to register support for the 
candidate when shown the labor contributors; conversely, Democratic partici-
pants were less likely to indicate support for the candidate when informed that 
the top contributors were corporations.184 
Similarly, Sances finds in a follow-up study that "simply providing voters 
with information about the ideological background of campaign funders has a 
marked impact on their ability to place the candidate" along the ideological 
spectrum. 185 This result holds for all voters; in other words, it is not just partisan 
voters who benefit from enhanced disclosures vis-a-vis the ideological back-
ground of contributors. Taken together, Sances's findings lend powerful support 
to the idea that disclosure aids voters by enabling them to identify candidate 
ideology, and in tum, to select candidates they believe best reflect their own 
views. 
In addition to the above, other research suggests that disclosure laws may 
confer even broader public benefits beyond improving voter decision making. 
For example, a 2006 study tests whether state-level campaign finance laws have 
an effect on levels of trust in government and "efficacy," which the authors 
define as "the belief that one can have an influence on the political process." 186 
The authors find that the existence of state campaign finance disclosure laws is 
positively, and statistically significantly, associated with affirmative answers to 
the questions "Do people have a say [in government]?" and "Do officials care 
[what people like them think]?" 187 
In sum, past social scientific research demonstrates that disclosure can serve 
as a useful heuristic in the identification of a candidate's ideological leanings 
and ultimately, in voter decision making, as the Supreme Court envisions. 188 
182. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
183. Id. at 56-57. 
184. See id. at 57-59. 
185. Id. at 62. 
186. David M. Primo & Jeffrey Milyo, Campaign Finance Laws and Political Efficacy: Evidence 
from the States, 5 ELecnoN L.J. 23, 26 (2006). 
187. Id. at 33-34 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
188. To be sure, disclosure has many detractors. And some empirical work, primarily in the 
consumer and patient contexts, suggests that disclosure not only fails to aid decision making, but in 
many cases actually results in worse decisions. A recent piece in the Journal of Public Policy and 
Marketing, for example, examines a number of experimental studies and finds that in the vast majority 
of those studies, "[m]andated messages increased confusion for consumers and were ineffective or 
1474 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 102:1443 
Moreover, it may have still other positive effects on the public's trust in gov-
ernment and sense of efficacy. But not all disclosure is created equal. Rather, 
scholars have identified a number of conditions under which disclosure is most 
efficacious for information users-in this case, the electorate-and when it may 
even serve to alter the behavior of disclosers. In the next section, we draw on 
studies of disclosure more broadly-including research about disclosure in 
other areas of concern-to distill lessons for designing the most effective 
disclosure regimes. 
2. Theorizing Effective Disclosure Regimes 
In addition to the social-scientific studies of campaign finance disclosure 
cited above, others have addressed the question of disclosure more broadly and 
have formulated theoretical frameworks for predicting the efficacy of disparate 
disclosure regimes. One such framework can be found in the work of Michael 
Malbin and Thomas Gais, who identify the elements of a successful disclosure 
regime in the campaign finance context. First, they argue, candidates and other 
entities must accurately report on their activities; second, those reports must 
actually describe the "activities and relationships of importance to voters"; 
third, the reports must be both usable and accessible; fourth, interested and 
knowledgeable intermediaries must synthesize the information and make it 
available to voters; and fifth, voters must be "able and willing to use the 
information as a basis for making an election decision." 189 As the authors 
explain, disclosure can only achieve its goals if each of the foregoing conditions 
harmful." Kesten C. Green & J. Scott Armstrong, Evidence on the Effects of Mandatory Disclaimers in 
Advertising, 31 J. Pull. PoL'Y & MARKETING 293, 293 (2012). It should be noted, however, that the 
authors reviewed a heterogeneous set of studies and neglected to consider the statistical significance of 
the underlying studies or of their meta-analysis. 
Another recent piece surveys the existing empirical literature on disclosure in the consumer and 
patient context, and concludes that mandated disclosure "chronically fails to accomplish its purpose." 
Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 647, 
651 (2011). The authors cite numerous studies highlighting the shortcomings of various disclosure 
schemes. Truth-in-lending legislation, for example, requires lenders to disclose basic loan features, but 
borrowers end up "overloaded by the number of disclosures, and do not understand the basic disclosed 
features of the loan." Id. at 666. In the sphere of informed consent, the authors describe research 
showing that even when doctors provide patients with all of the information "they would need to make 
educated decisions," patients "neither understand nor remember it." Id. at 668. 
Critically, however, none of the studies reviewed by Ben-Shahar and Schneider (or Green and 
Armstrong) examines disclosure in the context of campaign finance information. And there are 
significant differences between the settings discussed above and the campaign finance context. For one, 
voters in the context of campaigns are often flooded with information in the form of campaign and 
independent advertising but lack credible metrics for assessing that information. By contrast, consum-
ers (vis-a-vis truth-in-lending disclosure) and patients (vis-a-vis informed consent) frequently lack 
access to information with the exception of the disclosed material. Given its technical content, this type 
of disclosed information frequently overwhelms and confuses more than it empowers and illuminates. 
Indeed, much of the "failed" disclosure cited by the authors refers to detailed, technical information 
given to one party to a complex transaction. 
189. MICHAEL J. MALBIN & THOMAS L. GAIS, THE DAY AFTER REFORM: SOBERING CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN STATES 36 () 998). 
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is satisfied. 190 
Echoing the insights of Malbin and Gais, the book Full Disclosure examines 
and evaluates eighteen disclosure regimes-ranging from hygiene grades for 
restaurants to mortgage-lending disclosure-to discern when disclosure is most 
effective in both assisting information users and altering the behavior of disclos-
ers. It concludes that disclosure policies succeed "when they are user-centered," 
stating in particular: 
Successful policies focus first on the needs and interests of information users, 
as well as their abilities to comprehend the information provided by the 
system. Such policies also focus on the needs, interests, and capacities of 
disclosing organizations. They seek to embed new facts in the decision-
making routines of information users and to embed user responses into the 
decision making of disclosers. Successful transparency policies thus place the 
individuals and groups who will use information at center stage. 191 
The paradigmatic example of such disclosure is restaurant-hygiene disclosure, 
which takes the form of letter grades ("A," "B," etc.) posted in restaurant 
windows. As the authors explain, such grades "have become highly embedded 
in customers' and restaurant managers' existing decision processes. A restau-
rant's grade is available when users need it .. . where they need it ... and in a 
format that makes complex information quickly comprehensible." 192 And in 
addition to changing the decision calculus of diners, restaurant grades have also 
become embedded in disclosers ' decision-making processes. Restaurant manag-
ers "have both market and regulatory incentives to discern customers' percep-
tions of food safety," and those incentives have resulted, in one locality examined 
by the authors, in a "measurable increase[] in hygiene quality and a consequent 
significant drop in hospitalizations from food-related illnesses." 193 
To take another example, corporate financial disclosure-a disclosure regime 
tliat mandates publicly traded companies report financial information to the 
SEC 194-has become highly embedded in the decision-making processes of 
corporate managers through its effects, or anticipated effects, on the reactions of 
investors. As "[i]nstitutional and individual investors use key indicators from 
190. See id. 
191. FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 13, at I I. 
192. Id. at 82-83. As the authors elaborate: 
Transparency systems alter decisions only when they provide pertinent information that 
enables people to substantially improve their choices without imposing significant additional 
costs. That is one reason diners are more likely to use the window-front grades ... than 
Internet databases with similar information: the added cost of obtaining new information (in 
time, energy, and planning) is very low. 
Id. at 55. 
193. Id. at 83. 
194. See id. at 82; see also 15 U.S.C. § 781 (setting forth registration requirements); id. § 78m 
(disclosure requirements). 
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quarterly and annual reports to inform stock purchases and sales .... [c]ompany 
managers, in turn, track investor responses to their financial disclosures as a 
routine practice and respond to perceived investor concerns." 195 Thus, effective 
disclosure regimes work by offering well-timed, actionable, and easily com-
prehensible information--or information that can be rendered comprehensible 
by skilled intermediaries 196 -that becomes embedded in both users' and dis-
closers' decision-making processes. 
In this formulation, we suggest that one further criterion is implicit-that 
disclosure information be credible. In this context, Lupia and McCubbins 
postulate that political institutions may play a crucial role in signaling the 
credibility of disclosure information. In a political environment saturated with 
conflicting messages of often-dubious quality, political institutions (like the 
FEC) may aid voters by helping them assess speakers and their messages. 
Political institutions may "clarify a speaker's trustworthiness to citizens; pro-
vide effective substitutes for a speaker's character; allow people to make more 
effective decisions about whom to believe; allow citizens to learn what they 
need to know; and allow people who lack information to make reasoned 
choices."197 Disclosure, in an idealized form, conveys credible signals about 
candidates and members of Congress. It exposes the relationships between 
donors and recipients, and it creates formal (and informal) sanctions for noncom-
pliance. In so doing, mandatory disclosure can help ensure that the content of 
disclosure information is credible-in other words, a well-functioning disclo-
sure regime provides reliable, accurate, and trustworthy information to the 
electorate. In this way, the informational interest and the enforcement interest in 
disclosure may, in fact, be inextricably linked. 
To summarize, theories of disclosure suggest that effective disclosure regimes 
must offer information users easily accessible, easily comprehensible, action-
able, and credible information. But despite these documented ingredients of 
efficacy, the next Part highlights several significant limitations of the current 
disclosure regime. These limitations pose a serious obstacle to the ability of 
both voters and intermediaries to translate potentially valuable campaign fi-
nance disclosure information into credible signals, or shortcuts, to guide voter 
choice. Accordingly, we suggest that the recommendations detailed in this Part 
should be considered in the context of campaign finance disclosure, given its 
s·alience to current jurisprudence and reform debates. 
195. FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 13, at 82. 
196. For certain types of information, comprehensibility will nearly always require reliance on 
intermediaries. For example, because the data contained in corporate financial disclosures may be 
complex and require highly specialized vocabulary, "users often rely on intermediaries . . . to aid in 
embedding information in their investment choices." Id. at 65. 
197. Lupia & McCubbins, supra note 169, at 49. 
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Ill. THE REALITY OF DISCLOSURE 
A. THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT OF DISCLOSURE 
Before turning to our original analysis of the LECD, we briefly describe the 
organizational context for disclosure in the federal system 198-namely, the 
structure and authority granted to the FEC, the sole organization charged with 
enforcing the FECA and its amendments. Since its creation, the FEC has been 
subject to relentless criticism, 199 with agency critics often citing structural 
deficiencies as the primary source of the FEC's impotence. Critics have charged, 
in effect, that the very form of the Commission prevents its public servants from 
carrying out their duties in a rapidly changing campaign finance environment. 
Below we detail a few of the most common criticisms that have been leveled at 
the FEC. 
Unlike other regulatory bodies, such as the SEC, the FEC is headed by an 
even number of commissioners.200 Under the FECA, the FEC may have no 
more than three Commissioners from a single political party, which in practice 
has generally meant exactly three Democrats and three Republicans.201 This 
bipartisan structure has frequently led to gridlock in the enforcement and 
rulemaking processes, especially more recently as deep ideological differences 
have riven the two political parties.202 
Congressional leaders have also often played a large de facto role in the 
selection of the FEC's members.203 Historically, the Commissioners have been 
strong partisans with careers in politics, and often with ties to the very organiza-
tions-like PACs-they are charged with monitoring.204 The confirmation of 
FEC appointees has become a politically fraught process, with nominees often 
languishing in review for many months. In late spring 2013, for instance, the 
Commission was short one Commissioner after the resignation of Cynthia 
198. For a discussion of campaign finance disclosure in the states, see MALBIN & GA1s, supra 
note 189; Wilcox, supra note 134. 
199. See, e.g. , Todd Lochner & Bruce E. Cain, Equity and Efficacy in the Enforcement of Campaign 
Finance Laws, 77 TEX. L. REv. 1891, 1893 (1999) (describing the broad consensus that "the FEC at 
present does not adequately enforce the law, does not adequately deter potential malfeasants, and 
requires fundamental restructuring"). 
200. See 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(I) (2012). 
20 I. See Lauren Eber, Note, Waiting for Watergate: The Long Road to FEC Reform, 79 S. CAL. L. 
REv. 1155, 1165 (2006). 
202. See Dave Levinthal, How Washington Starves Its Election Watchdog, CENTER FOR Pus. INTEG-
RITY (Dec. 17, 2013, 5:40 AM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/12/l7/13996/how-washington-
starves-its-election-watchdog. See generally NOLAN McCARrY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD RosENTHAL, 
POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES (2008 ed. 2006). 
203. See JACKSON, supra note 160, at 29. 
204. See id. at 29-33. 
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Bauerly, and the otqer five standing Commissioners were each serving beyond 
the official ends of their terms. 205 
Although FEC statistics show that only a minority of cases are dismissed 
without substantive action due to a deadlock among the Commissioners, the 
cases that are dismissed tend to be "difficult, controversial issues affecting party 
entities or other players in the political process"-in other words, the most 
pressing campaign finance matters of the day. 206 And a recent report by Public 
Citizen showed a significant increase in the number of split votes on enforcing 
existing regulations and issuing advisory opinions, while the number of enforce-
ment actions has rapidly declined since 2008.207 These developments, taken 
together, have rendered the Commission increasingly ineffective in responding 
to changes in the way American elections are financed. 208 
As we describe below, the FEC also currently lacks the authority to undertake 
random audits of committee disclosure filings to ensure compliance with exist-
ing regulations. Instead, the FEC must rely on investigations that are initiated 
"for cause."209 In the case of an alleged campaign finance violation, the FEC 
may initiate a lengthy, multistage civil-enforcement process beginning with a 
"matter under review," which prompts an investigation.210 Each of the four 
stages of this process requires four affirmative votes from the Commissioners to 
proceed to the next phase.211 At the end of the often time-consuming process 
(and assuming a majority of the Commissioners has voted in the affirmative), 
the FEC may either persuade a respondent to enter into a conciliation agreement 
or file a civil suit on a de novo basis.212 
The number of stages in the civil-enforcement process-and the requirement 
of four affirmative votes at each-has significantly hindered the FEC's ability to 
pursue violations of the law in a timely manner. The average time for a case to 
close with substantive action taken exceeded 600 days for cases opened in 1995, 
205. See Jonathan D. Salant, Will the Federal Election Commission Ever Work Again?, BLOOMBERG 
BusINESSWEEK (May 2, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-05-02/will-the-federal-election-
commission-ever-work-again. 
206. PROJECT FEC, No BARK, No BITE, No POINT. THE CASE FOR CLOSING TifE FEDERAL ELECTION 
COMMISSION AND ESTABLISHING A NEW SYSTEM FOR ENFORCING 1llE NmoN's CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 56 
(2002), (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.democracy2J.org/uploads/%7BB4 
BE5C24-65EA-4910-974C-759644EC0901 %7D.pdf. 
207. See Press Release, Public Citizen, Roiled in Partisan Deadlock, Federal Election Commission 
Is Failing (2012), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/fec-deadlock-press-statement.pdf. 
208. See id.; Christopher Rowland, Deadlock by Design Hobbles Election Agency, Bos. GLOBE 
(July 7, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/07 /06/america-campaign-finance-
watchdog-rendered-nearly-toothless-its-own-appointed-commissioners/44zZoJwnzEHyzxTByNL2QP/ 
story.html. 
209. See Scarr & MULLEN, supra note 161, at 12-13; Lochner & Cain, supra note 199, at 1929. 
210. Thomas E. Mann, The FEC: Administering and Enforcing Campaign Finance Law, in THE NEw 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE SouRCEBOOK 232, 236 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 2005); Trevor Potter, Campaign 
Finance Disclosure Laws. in THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE SoURCEBOOK, supra: at 123, 134. 
211. See Mann, supra note 210. 
212. See Eber, supra note 201, at 1170; Kenneth A. Gross, The Enforcement of Campaign Finance 
Rules: A System in Search of Reform, 9 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 279, 284-85 (1991). 
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1997, and 2000, and averaged well over a year for 1996, 1998, and 1999.213 
Between fiscal years 1995 and 2000, the FEC dismissed 54% of cases without 
tal<lng substantive action.2 14 The median penalty was less than $5,000 between 
1985 and 1993, and near $10,000 between 1994 and 2001.215 Given that fines 
are normally not levied in the same election cycle as an alleged violation and 
the relatively low amount of the average fine, some have speculated that the 
FEC's main enforcement protocol may simply be viewed as a "cost of doing 
business" by candidates and donors.216 
B. THE FEC'S DISCLOSURE DATA: FLAWS AND LIMITATIONS 
Despite problems with the rulemal<lng and enforcement procedures at the 
FEC, the current disclosure regime has generally been touted as a success, and 
indeed, an antidote to the potentially corrupting influence of political money. 217 
Yet a close examination of the current reality of disclosure both highlights the 
limitations of the disclosure regime and exposes areas where the FEC's author-
ity might be legitimately modified or expanded to better achieve the goals of 
disclosure. In the research detailed below, one of the authors has capitalized on 
the availability of disclosure data on individual contributions to map the con-
tours of elite political alignments over time and to identify the nation's largest 
and most consistent donors.218 One of the most challenging aspects of this work 
has been the quality of the information contained in the FEC records, despite 
the seeming surfeit of data available to the public. Below we describe a few of 
the issues encountered in analyzing the FEC data. 
Each year the FEC receives hundreds of thousands-and in recent elections, 
millions--of pages of disclosure documents from candidates and political com-
mittees itemizing contributions made by individual donors.219 Despite the vol-
ume of filings-and the sustained growth in the absolute number of itemized 
contributions in recent election cycles--candidates and political committees are 
currently not required to use a standardized disclosure form to collect basic 
213. FEC, ENFORCEMENT PROALE 8 (2005), available at http://www.fec.gov/em/enfpro/enfpro2005.pdf. 
214. SCOTT & MULLEN, supra note 161, at 14. 
215. Id. 
216. PROJECT FEC, supra note 206, at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
217. See id. at 7; see also McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1460 (2014) ("[D]isclosure now 
offers a particularly effective means of arming the voting public with information .. .. Reports and 
databases are available on the FEC's Web site almost immediately after they are filed . ... [M]assive 
quantities of information can be accessed at the click of a mouse .. .. "). 
218. The donations of unique contributors were linked using a probabilistic record-matching algo-
rithm. In contrast to deterministic matching procedures, probabilistic record linkage quantifies the 
likelihood that any pair of observations represents a true match by assigning weights to a number of 
independent match identifiers (here contributor surname, first name, middle initial, occupation, ZIP 
Code, and gender). The weights take into account the identifying power and the degree of error in each 
match variable. As we note infra, we err on the side of caution in all of the estimates presented below 
by excluding all false positives. Thus, the estimates we describe in this section are conservative by 
design. 
219. See Scorr & MULLEN, supra note 161, at 1 I. 
1480 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 102:1443 
information on individual donors. Instead, the FEC's candidate guide advises 
candidates to obtain the name, mailing address, occupation, and employer for 
all individual contributors whose donations aggregate to over $200 in an 
election cycle. 220 In the event that contributors do not disclose this informa-
tion with their initial donation, campaigns are asked to send a follow-up 
solicitation within thirty days. After the follow-up solicitation, candidate cam-
paigns may indicate in their disclosure reports to the FEC that they made a 
"best efforts" attempt.221 Not surprisingly then, the full LECD includes nearly 
20,000 instances of "Best Effort" or "Info Requested" in place of contributor 
information. 222 
Even when disclosure fields are not blank, contributor compliance with 
disclosure requirements is often minimal. Broadly, four reporting problems 
pervade the FEC records-selective compliance, valid nonresponse, low re-
sponse consistency, and dissimulation.223 Selective compliance refers to the 
many instances of incomplete donor information. For example, donors typically 
220. See FEC, CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES AND COMMITTEES 73 (20 I I), available at http://www.fec.gov/ 
pdf/candgui.pdf. 
221. Id. at 76. 
222. Since its inception, FECA has prescribed particular identifying information to be collected 
from certain contributors. 2 U.S.C. § 43 I (l 3)(A) (2012) (defining "identification," for individual 
contributors, as including "the name, the mailing address, and the occupation of such individual, as well 
as the name of his or her employer"); 2 U.S.C. § 434 (2012) (describing reporting requirements); 
11 CFR § 100.12 (2011) (elaborating on definition of "identification"). But an early amendment to the 
FECA added a proviso that "best efforts" to gather such information were sufficient. Federal Election 
Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475, 480. And an FEC regulation 
first enacted in 1981 elaborates on this statutory "best efforts" standard, providing, at least in the case of 
PACs, that "[w]hen the treasurer of a political committee shows that best efforts have been used to 
obtain, maintain and submit the information required by the Act for the political committee, any 
report of such committee shall be considered in compliance with the Act." 11 C.F.R. § 104.7(a) (2012). 
The regulation goes on to explain that "[f]or each contribution . . . which lacks required contributor 
information, such as the contributor 's full name, mailing address, occupation or name of employer," 
compliance with the "best efforts" standard merely requires the treasurer to make "at least one effort 
after the receipt of the contribution to obtain the missing information" and "[s]uch effort shall consist of 
either a written request sent to the contributor or an oral request to the contributor documented in 
writing." Id. § 104.7(a)(2); accord Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, 76 F.3d 400, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(upholding the FEC's requirement that political committees make one follow-up attempt to gather 
missing contributor information, but invalidating a separate regulatory provision requiring committees 
to include in such follow-up requests a statement indicating that federal law required them to report 
contributor-identifying information). 
Current FEC enforcement guidelines, however, suggest that compliance with the "best efforts" stan-
dard will not insulate committees from scrutiny. As an enforcement manual explains, "if a committee 
that established best efforts are being made still has a large percentage of the individual contributions 
lacking the adequate contributor information at the end of the election cycle," that committee will be 
assessed "audit points." FEC, REPORTS ANALYSIS DIVISION REVIEW AND REFERRAL PROCEDURES FOR THE 
2011-2012 ELECTION CYCLE 83 (201 I), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/RAD_Procedures.pdf. A 
certain threshold of audit points may result in referral for an audit. See id. at 16. 
223. Because donations were linked using a probabilistic algorithm, pairwise combinations of 
contributions did not need to have identical values on all of the match variables to be brought together 
into a group. Instead, contributions had to agree on a subset of variables with sufficiently high match 
weights. 
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disclose a first and last name, but, as we detail below, often neglect or decline to 
include their employer and occupation. Valid nonresponse refers to noninforma-
tive disclosure information. For example, many contributors are listed as "self-
employed," which counts as a valid response for the purposes of disclosure 
requirements, but conveys little information about the interests a donor may 
represent. Low response consistency refers to within-contributor variation in 
responses over time unrelated to underlying changes in a donor's characteristics 
or status. Lastly, dissimulation refers to the practice of purposeful misrepresenta-
tion of a contributor's identity or interests. Figure 1 presents individual disclo-
sure filings for a number of unique contributors, with each contributor grouping 
illustrating one or more of the types of noncompliance defined above. Each row 
in the table represents one discrete, itemized contribution that was made to a 
candidate or political party. 
All individual contributors to federal elections are required to disclose their 
full names. However, the FEC does not mandate-and reporting candidates and 
committees, in turn, do not request-that contributors provide their full legal 
names. Not surprisingly, contributors are apt to provide nicknames, initials, and 
other variations of their full legal names on disclosure forms. The first contribu-
tor in Figure 1, James, contributed more than forty times in twenty-six years.224 
Over these twenty-six years, James is variously listed as James, Jay, and "J." 
Similarly, Contributor 2 in Figure 1 sometimes lists his full name, Raymond, 
and at other times appears under a nickname, Randy. 
The next required piece of donor information, occupation, could aid in the 
identification of socially significant patterns of political influence across indus-
tries, or help voters discern which industries have "endorsed" a candidate. For 
those who do report an occupation, the disclosure filings lack a standardized 
reporting system for occupation, resulting in a hodgepodge of self-reported 
occupations (for example, school teacher), positions (for example, chief execu-
tive officer), sectors (for example, finance), and specific employers (for ex-
ample, Goldman Sachs). The honor system governing disclosure also produces 
a high degree of valid nonresponses. Although donors disclose an occupation, 
many of the most frequent occupations listed in the FEC files are noninforma-
tive. "Retired," "lawyer," and "homemaker" dominate the files, as well as 
contributors who are "self-employed" or "not employed." Figure 2 plots the 
fifteen most frequent "occupations" found in the LECD, which include "stu-
dent" and "self-employed writer." 
A degree of creativity also informs the occupations that donors do report. To 
illustrate, the third contributor in Figure 1 lists his employer as "Dunder 
Mifflin"-the fictional office supply company featured on the popular television 
224. Last names of contributors, names of specific employers, and ZIP codes have been removed to 
protect the identities of donors. Our objective is not to highlight specific individuals, but to expose a 
widespread practice through several illustrative examples. 
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Figure 1. 
Disclosure Entries including Year of Contribution, First Name, Occupation, and State for 
Five Unique Individual Contributors in the LECD 
# Year First Occupation State 
1980 James Law Firm WA 
1 1984 Lawyer WA 
1994 James Law Firm WA 
2000 Jay Lawyer WA 
2002 Randy Self Employed Oil Gas OK 
2 2004 Raymond Go Petroleum OK 
2006 Randy Self Employed Oil Gas OK 
3 2008 Barry Dunder Mifflin Assistant to Region A IL 
1980 Charles Home TX 
1980 Charles Investments TX 
1980 Charles Investor TX 
1980 Charles Oil Gas Investments TX 
1986 Charles Self TX 
1988 Charles Businessman KY 
1988 Charles Geologist TX 
1988 Charles Horse Breeder KY 
1990 Charles Breeding Racing KY 
4 1994 Charles Horseman KY 
1996 Charles Investment Relations KY 
1996 Charles Self KY 
1996 Charles Tbred Breeding Racg KY 
1998 Charles Farmer KY 
1998 Charles Horse Owner Breeder KY 
2000 Charles Race Horse Farm KY 
2004 Charles Self Employed Owner Farm KY 
2004 Charles Company Executive KY 
2008 Charles Self Employed Thoroughbreds KY 
2002 Philip Vice President VA 
2002 Philip Vice President VA 
2002 Philip Executive VA 
2002 Philip Vice President FL 
20()2 Philip Vice President VA 
5 
2006 Philip NA Retired FL 
2006 Philip None Retired FL 
2006 Philip Apollo Technologies VA 
2006 Philip NA Retired FL 
2006 Philip Retired VA 
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Figure 2. 
Frequencies (in millions) of the Fifteen Most Common Self-Reported 
Occupations in the LECD 
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show The Office.225 The fourth contributor in Figure 1, Charles, has donated for 
nearly thirty years and has made more than a hundred distinct contributions. 
Charles variously appears as "businessman," "horse breeder," "farmer," "oil 
and gas investor,'' "investor,'' and "self-employed,'' among others. Charles is, in 
a way, all of these things. The grandson of an oil tycoon, Charles is also a 
co-owner and board member of numerous energy and investment companies, as 
well as the owner of a thoroughbred horse farm. Later in his career, Charles 
served as a high-ranking State Department official, but during that time he 
continued to report his occupation as a racehorse-farm owner (his modal 
self-reported occupation). That Charles selectively identifies as a "farmer" and a 
"horseman" impedes identification of Charles as a distinct individual donor, but 
it may also suggest a degree of selective reporting-or possibly disingenuous-
ness-among contributors. As we note later, many of these discrepancies-
whether intentional or not-could be remedied by improving the FEC's system 
for soliciting donor information. 
The current disclosure regime also requires contributors to report a mailing 
address along with an itemized contribution. Again, "mailing address" means 
different things to different contributors. Contributors may report a home 
address or a primary residence, but they also routinely provide mailing ad-
dresses for businesses or employers. For some, mailing address may even be 
reported at a second or vacation house. Charles, described above, appears in two 
cities in two different states within the 1988 election cycle-one corresponding 
225. This contribution predates the launch of the Dunder Mifflin copy paper now sold at the office 
supply store Staples. See Suzanne Vranica, Great Scott! Dumler Mifflin Morphs into Real-Life Brand of 
Copy Paper, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 28, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970 
203764804577060463594279098. 
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to a residential address and the other to a horse farm in another state. Contribu-
tor 5, Philip, appears at two different residential addresses within an election 
cycle~ne near the headquarters of his most recently listed employer and one 
in an exclusive residential neighborhood in North Palm Beach, Florida. 
A more complex issue vis-a-vis the FEC's disclosure records stems from the 
structure of the disclosure data. A common misconception is that the FEC 
aggregates data on individual contributors. In fact, the FEC merely catalogs 
contributions. In other words, there is no mechanism for identifying unique 
donors or to whom those donors have contributed, and the task is made more 
difficult given the forms of nonresponsiveness and evasion detailed above. This 
has at least two implications. For one, the lack of a unique donor number 
prevents identification of the biggest or most consistent donors-perhaps the 
donors of most concern to voters. The apparent surfeit of disclosure thus gives 
the illusion of transparency, but functions instead to obscure the most pertinent 
financial constituencies in a sea of data.226 As the system exists now, "the more 
we look, the less we understand. "227 
Second, the lack of a formal mechanism for aggregating contributions originat-
ing from unique individuals has had profound implications for the enforcement 
of the federal aggregate-contribution limits. Although the aggregate limits were 
invalidated by the Court in McCutcheon v. FEC,228 the FEC's enforcement track 
record with respect to those limits continues to offer an important lesson on the 
shortcomings of the current disclosure system. 
Because the FEC does not itemize contributors, the mechanism by which 
violations of the aggregate-contribution limits might have been identified and 
sanctioned has always been unclear. In the research described above, one of the 
authors has linked all contributions beginning in 1980 by contributor. In so 
doing, she found that exceeding the legal contribution limits was not uncommon 
and indeed was fairly prevalent among contributors who made donations at or 
near the legal aggregate maximum. Figure 3 gives the frequency distribution of 
the estimated number of donors who exceeded the maximum aggregate-
contribution limit between 1980 and 2008. 229 The figure indicates that over the 
twenty-eight years from 1980 through 2008, approximately 1,700 individual 
contributors violated federal maximums. The high point for such violations of 
existing law occurred in the contentious 2000 presidential election, when 310 
individual contributors made donations exceeding the $50,000 ceiling in effect 
for that cycle. 230 
226. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About Disclosure, 44 lND. L. REV. 255, 265-66 (2010). 
227. LESSIG, supra note 157, at 257. 
228. 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014). 
229. We exclude all potential false positives before calculating the number of total contributors who 
violated the limit in each election cycle. Thus, the estimates presented here are conservative by design 
and represent lower-bound estimates of the actual number of over-limit contributors. 
230. For alternative estimates, see also Adam Bonica & Jenny Shen, Breaching the Biennial Limit: 
Why the FEC Has Failed to Enforce Aggregate Hard-Money Limits and How Record Linkage Tech-
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Figure 3. 
Number of Individual Contributors that Exceeded the Aggregate Election Year 











1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 
Election Year 
The statistics in Figure 3 are especially striking if we consider the small 
number of donors at or near the legal maximum in the LECD. For instance, 
during the 2007-2008 election cycle, the LECD shows that 263 individual 
contributors donated an amount exceeding 90% of the $108,200 aggregate limit 
(that is, these contributors donated an amount above $97,380). Of these 263, 
Figure 3 shows that 137 violated the aggregate limit. Thus, using this smaller 
denominator from the LECD, 48% of donors who contributed above $97,380 
exceeded the federal aggregate limit in 2008. As a percentage of donors above 
90% of the election cycle aggregate limit, we calculated that contributors who 
have violated the legal aggregate limit ranged from 48% in 2008 to 68% in 
1984. 
Each of these deficiencies in the existing regime urges additional reflection 
on what, in theory, we might hope to gain from disclosure vis-a-vis each of the 
potential audiences of disclosure. In the section below, we enumerate the three 
most important audiences for such data-voters, informational intermediaries, 
and regulators-and describe how the current reality of disclosure falls far short 
for each constituency. 
nology Can Help, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 563, 578 (2013). Bonica and Shen utilize "a customized 
linkage algorithm written in R and MySQL designed specifically for linking contributions records 
across state and federal reporting agencies." Id. at 576. Details of the linkage algorithm have not, as of 
this writing, been made publicly available. Their estimates cover the 2003-2004 through 20ll-2012 
election cycles. For the three election cycles that overlap with our analysis (2003-2004, 2005-2006, 
2007-2008), the estimates presented here are more conservative. This discrepancy likely reflects both 
the differences in linkage procedures and the ultimate treatment of potential false positives. While we 
opt to exclude groups of contributor observations that may have been erroneously joined into a group, 
Bonica and Shen include these observations and note that "two individuals with similar personal 
information may be erroneously grouped together" in their counts. Id. at 579. 
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C. AUDIENCES FOR DISCLOSURE 
1. Voters 
[Vol. 102:1443 
The most important audience for disclosure is, of course, voters. As the 
empirical literature shows, disclosure can assist voters in reaching informed 
decisions, but only under certain conditions. The current conditions of the FEC 
disclosure regime, however, are far from optimal for this crucial information 
constituency. 
The FEC posts contribution records on its website as they become avail-
able from candidate and political committees. Visitors to the website may 
search for disclosure filings-for instance, a contribution made by an individual 
to a presidential candidate-through the FEC's campaign finance data-
disclosure portal.231 Unfortunately, the large majority of usable disclosure 
information-including the details of aggregate donations from particular donor 
constituencies-is not readily accessible on the website, nor is converting the 
raw FEC files to a usable format an easy task. To gain an understanding of such 
patterns, voters must rely on so-called informational intermediaries, detailed 
below. 
The bulk of existing disclosure data, including information about the sources 
from which a candidate has received money over time, is also available for 
download on the FEC website in the form of "detailed files" listing each 
contribution a particular candidate or committee received in an election cycle.232 
The files are formatted as raw text files-to the untrained eye, they appear as 
long rows of jumbled letters and numbers.233 Using the files involves download-
ing thousands or possibly millions of records, having access to a software 
program capable of reading a large amount of data (generally beyond the 
capacity of Microsoft Excel), and then creating a corresponding "data diction-
ary" for the disclosure information to be properly formatted. 234 After this 
tedious process, the user must then analyze the data-a task that potentially 
requires not only technological know-how, but also some understanding of 
statistics. As a result, most voters are dependent on informational intermediaries 
to clean, code, and analyze the FEC data. Voters thus have no unmediated 
understanding of the disclosure data. Instead, what voters learn of patterns of 
influence in the campaign finance system is filtered through the interpretive lens 
of informational intermediaries. 
231. See Campaign Finance Reports and Data, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/ 
disclosure.shtml (last visited Feb. 14, 2014). 
232. See Detailed Files About Candidates, Parties, and Other Committees, FED. ELECTION COMMIS-
SION, http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/ftpdet.shtml (last visited Feb. 3, 2014). 
233. For an example of a downloadable data set, see Contributions by Individuals 2000, FED. ELEC-
TION COMMISSION, ftp://ftp.fec.gov/FEC/2000/indivOO.zip (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
234. See, e.g., Data Dictionary-Contributions by Individuals, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http:// 
www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/metadata/DataDictionaryContributionsbylndividuals.shtml (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2014) (describing different variables in one type of data dictionary). These variable designa-
tions would then need to be manually entered before analyzing the data. 
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As this brief description establishes, the disclosure data the FEC provides to 
voters directly do not, as presently constituted, meaningfully facilitate voters' 
use of FEC data to, as the Supreme Court imagines, "make informed decisions 
and give proper weight to different speakers and messages."235 
2. Informational Intermediaries 
Although Citizens United identified voters as the primary audience for dis-
closure, in practice it has been "informational intermediaries" that first "select, 
analyze, and disseminate a more manageable version of disclosed informa-
tion. "236 These informational intermediaries include journalists, who analyze 
the files in the aftermath of a political corruption scandal or to discern patterns 
of political influence, and academic researchers, who have used the FEC files to 
examine the political alignments of wealthy and corporate elites.237 Nonprofit 
research organizations and watchdogs like the Center for Responsive Politics 
(CRP),238 the Campaign Finance Institute (CFl),239 and the Sunlight Founda-
tion240 have done the work of providing detailed analyses of trends in campaign 
financing and distributing more manageable versions of the FEC disclosure 
files. The CRP has also developed an i~frastructure for users to undertake their 
own analyses of the raw FEC records, including a dedicated website for 
tutorials on using the FEC files and a community discussion board that acts as a 
support group for data users.241 
As a result of these efforts to make the FEC disclosure data more manage-
able, nonprofits like the CRP have, in fact, become the data outlet of choice for 
much of the political news media. In a 2002 survey of political journalists, the 
CRP was rated the top website used by political journalists, with the FEC's own 
235. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310,371 (2010). 
236. Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REv. 1089, 1102 (2007). 
237. See generally DAN CLAWSON, ALAN NEUSTADTL & MARK WELLER, DOLLARS AND VOTES: How 
BUSINESS CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS SUBVERT DEMOCRACY (1998); McCARTY ET AL., supra note 202; Val 
Burris, The Political Partisanship of American Business: A Study of Corporate Political Action 
Committees, 52 AM. Soc. REv. 732 (1987); Val Burris, The Two Faces of Capital: Corporations and 
Individual Capitalists as Political Actors, 66 AM. Soc. REv. 361 (2001); Dan Clawson et al., The Logic 
of Business Unity: Corporate Contributions to the 1980 Congressional Elections, 51 AM. Soc. REv. 797 
(1986). 
238. See, e.g., Politicians and Elections, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE PoLmcs, http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
elections/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2014). 
239. See, e.g., Federal, CAMPAIGN FIN. INST. , http://www.cfinst.org/federal.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 
2014). 
240. See, e.g., Rea/time Federal Campaign Finance, SUNLIGHT FOUND., http://reporting.sunlight 
foundation.com/outside-spenders/2014/super-pacs/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2014). 
241. See Google Group for OpenSecrets Open Data, https://groups.goog1e.com/forum/?fromgroups#! 
forum/opensecrets-open-data; OpenData Documentation, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE PoLmcs, http://www. 
opensecrets.org/resources/create/data_doc.php (last visited Feb. 3, 2014). 
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website falling into a distant third place.242 The dependence of political jour-
nalists on the disclosure data of informational intermediaries like the CRP 
has raised concerns about journalists' awareness and understanding of how 
these outlets clean and categorize the contributions catalogued in the FEC data. 
The CRP-in an effort to make the FEC data both accessible and useful-
"categor[izes] the money and mak[es] some assumptions about the motives of 
donors."243 Because many journalists do not analyze the FEC data directly, "it's 
unclear if many journalists who use these data know much about the coding 
debate" surrounding, for instance, classifying self-reported donor occupations 
into standard, consistent entries for individual donors. 244 
Nonprofit organizations have played a central role in disseminating disclosure 
data and in making this data accessible to the public. But as we suggested above 
in our discussion of cognitive heuristics, we propose that the efficacy of 
disclosure data may, in part, hinge on the credibility of the discloser. Given that 
many current nonprofits also advocate reform goals, the task of aggregating, 
cleaning, disseminating, and analyzing disclosure data might best be kept the 
primary responsibility of the FEC. 245 
3. Regulators 
Finally, the current disclosure regime fails to meet the needs of another 
crucial audience-regulators. Even the FEC describes the current system as 
being partially self-governing, and its institutional mission as one of encourag-
ing "voluntary compliance" with existing law. 246 But as the high number of 
violations of individual aggregate limits shown in Figure 3 makes clear, the 
system has often failed to check abuses of existing law. 
In Part IV, we outline several policy recommendations that would consider-
ably enhance the FEC's ability to effectively further the interests disclosure is 
designed to serve. 
242. See Albert L. May, The Vinual Trail: Political Journalism on the Internet, INST. FOR PoLmcs 
DEMOCRACY & THE INTERNET 22 (2002), http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/ 
Reports/The_practice_ofjournalism/pp_onlinejournalist.pdf. 
243. Id. at 26. 
244. Id. at 27. 
245. For an alternative perspective on the government's appropriate role in disseminating data, see 
David Robinson et al., Government Data and the Invisible Hand, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 160 (2009). The 
authors agree that "[g]overnment must provide data," but they argue that "Web sites that provide 
interactive access for the public can best be built by private parties" rather than the government itself. 
Id. at 161. Although we, too, see virtue in open data infrastructures that make data easily "reusable" for 
informational intermediaries, we disagree with the suggestion that "[a]s long as there is vigorous 
competition between third party sites ... most citizens will be able to find a site provider they trust," 
such that government entities should be cut out of the process of data analysis and dissemination 
entirely. Id. at 174. 
246. FEC, PERFORMANCE AND AccouNTABILITY REPORT l (2012), available at http://www.fec.gov/pages/ 
budget/fy2012/FEc_PAR_FY _2012-Final.pdf. 
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IV. IMPROVING DISCLOSURE 
As we have seen, the Supreme Court's cases have tended· to assume that the 
extant disclosure regime is capable of creating ( or at least assisting in the 
creation of) an informed and competent electorate able to critically evaluate 
campaign-related speech in order to choose among candidates and hold elected 
officials accountable if they are excessively responsive to the desires of large 
donors at the expense of their constituents. This assumption has significant 
consequences: the Court often appears emboldened to strike down laws that 
place various substantive limits on the use of money in elections precisely 
because it believes disclosure is capable of advancing the compelling interests it 
has credited in the campaign finance sphere. 
Like Supreme Court decisions, legislative-reform proposals are often pre-
mised upon a relatively well-functioning (if insufficiently far-reaching) disclo-
sure regime, with expansion of the existing regime as the guiding reform 
principle. Too often, scholarship on disclosure and campaign finance has been 
predicated on a similarly idealized conception of a regime of disclosure. Few 
published works have grappled with the on-the-ground reality of disclosure or 
put theoretical insights into conversation with what social scientists have learned 
about voters' decision-making processes. 
We believe that "policymakers can improve the competence of ordinary 
voters by structuring the information environment to provide citizens with cues 
or heuristics that will help them vote competently with limited data. Appropri-
ately tailored disclosure statutes are vital to this endeavor."247 Below we detail a 
set of policy recommendations for modifying and improving the existing system 
of disclosure. We assume here that the FEC will continue to be charged with 
this function, contrary to the calls of some reformers, 248 and we do not here 
address the IRS or its standards for granting tax-exempt status to organizations 
that may engage in political activity.249 
A. DISCLOSURE DATA: COLLECTION, PROCESSING, AND DISSEMINATION 
First, the current categories of information sought by the FEC do not ad-
equately capture, or allow the FEC in tum to accurately report, relevant 
information about donors to campaigns. To slightly update an example offered 
by Elizabeth Garrett, "it may substantially improve the electoral decisions of 
ordinary citizens if they know that [George Soros] supports one candidate and 
[Sheldon Adelson] another, or that the NRA supports one candidate and the 
247 . Garrett & Smith, supra note 172, at 297. 
248. For a proposal that calls for dismantling the FEC, see generally PROJECT FEC, supra note 206. 
249. For useful discussions of related questions in the context of 50l(c)(4), see Ellen P. Aprill, 
Regulating the Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt Organizations After Citizens United, 10 
ELECTION L.J. 363, 402---05 (2011); Terence Dougherty, Section 50J(c)(4) Advocacy Organizations: 
Political Candidate-Related and Other Partisan Activities in Furtherance of the Social Welfare, 36 
SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1337, 1391-1400 (2013); Donald B. Tobin, Campaign Disclosure and Tax-Exempt 
Entities: A Quick Repair to the Regulatory Plumbing, 10 ELECTION L.J. 427, 439-47 (201 I) . 
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Sierra Club another."250 But only a small set of donors will be immediately 
familiar to many voters, the way George Soros and Sheldon Adelson are. For 
most other donors, accurate and complete information about occupation, indus-
try, residence, and aggregate contributions is critical, so that, at a minimum, 
informational intermediaries can review and synthesize large-scale data. But at 
present, there is insufficient accuracy and completeness for social scientists, 
engaged citizens, or informational intermediaries to confidently infer broader 
patterns of political influence. 
1. Data Collection 
In response, mandating completion of all fields as a precondition of a 
campaign or third party's ability to accept a contribution is one way to ensure 
that nonresponses do not dominate the self reports of donors. In light of the 
enshrinement in the law of the "best efforts" standard,251 this change would 
require congressional action to effectuate. 
Increasing accuracy in the reporting of "employment" is another important 
improvement that could be made to the FEC's data collection. Occupation is an 
important metric for tracking political influence; in the aggregate, the positions 
and preferences of various sectors of industry could provide easily interpretable 
cues to voters about the interests a candidate is likely to serve once in office. 
One possible fix is to make the FEC reporting forms more like the Census 
Bureau's 2000 "long" form questionnaire,252 a survey designed to supplement 
the basic population characteristics compiled by the census. The long form asks 
respondents three discrete questions with embedded subprompts that probe for 
both occupation and industry. The first question in the series asks about the 
respondent's industry or employer, and then follows up with questions about 
occupation: 
Industry or Employer-Describe clearly this persons chief job activity or 
business last week. If this person had more than one job, describe the one at 
which this person worked the most hours. If this person had no job or 
business last week, give the information for his/her last job or business since 
1995. 
a. For whom did this person work? ... Name of company, business, or 
other employer 
250. Elizabeth Garrett, The William J. Brennan Lecture in Constitutional Law: The Future of 
Campaign Finance Reform Laws in the Courts and in Congress, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 665, 681 
(2002) (using Jane Fonda and Ross Perot in the original text). 
251. See supra note 222. 
252. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, UNITED ST= CENSUS 2000 (2000), available 
at http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/pdf/d-6 l b.pdf. 
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b. What kind of business or industry was this? Describe the activity at 
location where employed. (For example: hospital, newspaper publishing, mail 
order house, auto repair shop, bank) 
c. Is this mainly-Mark lg] ONE box. 
D Manufacturing? 
D Wholesale trade? 
D Retail trade? 
D Other (agriculture, construction, service, government, etc.)? 
Occupation 
a. What kind of work was this person doing? (For example: registered 
nurse, personnel manager, supervisor of order department, auto mechanic, 
accountant) 
b. What were this person's most important activities or duties? (For 
example: patient care, directing hiring policies, supervising order clerks, 
repairing automobiles, reconciling financial records)253 
The nested structure of the questions guides respondents to supply informa-
tion that will aid in the classification of respondents into universal categories. 
For ease of interpretation, each question offers examples to respondents and 
then allows respondents to fill in a free-form response. 
The FEC might adopt a similar standardized question format for contributors 
making in-person or online contributions. In a paper format, contributors might 
be asked to answer a simple and short series of nested questions to ensure 
accuracy of responses and to facilitate the classification of donors into universal 
categories. For contributions made online, contributors could be provided with a 
series of drop-down menus from which to select a category, followed by short, 
free-form fields. As survey researchers have long known, the form of the 
response is often in the form of the question, and coaxing information from 
respondents requires careful survey design. 254 
There are several other simple amendments to the FEC's current disclosure 
regime that could greatly enhance the quality of data it collects from donors. In 
particular, the FEC could adopt a standardized disclosure form for both political 
253. Id. at 7. 
254. See Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman, Framing Theory, IO ANN. REv. PoL. Sc1. 103, 104 
(2007) (describing framing effects in opinion surveys that "occur when (often small) changes in the 
presentation of an issue or an event produce (sometimes large) changes of opinion"); Tom W. Smith, 
That Which We Call Welfare by Any Other Name Would Smell Sweeter: An Analysis of the Impact of 
Question Wording on Response Patterns, 51 Pue. OPINION Q. 75, 76 (1987) ("Since the same word can 
conjure significantly different meanings to different respondents, it is not surprising that different words 
designed to tap the same object or feeling state can actually serve as significantly different stimuli and 
trigger different response patterns."). · 
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committees and third-party spenders255 to provide to donors, both online and on 
paper. The form could collect the same basic pieces of donor information but 
more closely resemble a brief survey. For instance, the disclosure form could 
supply the donor with a short explanation of the form itself (for example: "Full 
disclosure of donors' information is federally mandated and legally required. 
The information will be used for statistical analyses."). Then, instead of simply 
asking donors to supply "last name" and "first name," for instance, the form 
could ask that donors supply full legal given name and surname. The same 
revision could be made for other required pieces of donor information. In other 
words, the form of each question should compel donors to disclose complete, 
valid, and reliable information. 
·2. Data Sources 
Second, as a number of others have argued, 256 the range of entities from 
which the FEC requires data about campaign expenditures and underlying 
donations must be expanded to clearly encompass outside entities, in addition to 
campaigns and political committees. 
One possible solution, proposed by Richard Briffault, is to expand the 
definition of political committee "either by broadening the definition of what 
constitutes an electoral expenditure, or by treating an organization as a political 
committee for campaign finance reporting purposes if it engages in a threshold 
level of electoral activity even though most of its expenditures are not for 
electoral purposes."257 But in light of the Supreme Court's concerns, expressed 
in Citizens United, about the burdens involved in political-committee status,258 
a far safer solution-advocated by Briffault as a preferable alternative-would 
simply be to "require the disclosure of donations to organizations that engage in 
a threshold level of independent expenditures, whether or not they are political 
committees. "259 
The text of BCRA actually already requires such disclosure-any person or 
entity that spends more than $10,000 on "electioneering communications" must 
file a report within twenty-four hours with the FEC.260 The statute mandates 
255. As we argue infra, either legislative or regulatory action should be taken to clarify that 
third-party spenders are also subject to disclosure requirements. 
256. See Briffault, Two Challenges, supra note 6, at 1010; Briffault, Updating Disclosure, supra 
note 3, at 693; Potter & Morgan, supra note 19, at 425. 
257. Briffault, Updating Disclosure, supra note 3, at 693. 
258. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 337 (2010) ("[T]he option to form PACs does not 
alleviate the First Amendment problems with §441b. PACs are burdensome alternatives; they are 
expensive to administer and subject to extensive regulations. For example, every PAC must appoint a 
treasurer, forward donations to the treasurer promptly, keep detailed records of the identities of the 
persons making donations, preserve receipts for three years, and file an organization statement and 
report changes to this information within 10 days."); see also Richard Briffault, Corporations, 
Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign Finance After Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 
643, 663-70 (2011). 
259. Briffault, Updating Disclosure, supra note 3, at 693. 
260. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f) (2012); see supra section LC. 
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that the disclosure form contain the name and address of anyone who "con-
tributed an aggregate amount of $1,000 or more to the person making the 
disbursement" within the preceding year. 261 But, as discussed above, the FEC 
has decided to require disclosure of the sources of only those contributions 
"made for the purpose of furthering electioneering communications."262 
The FEC could simply promulgate a new regulation that would reverse its 
interpretation of existing statutory law and clearly require disclosure of all 
contributors to organizations that engage in election-related spending. Alterna-
tively, Congress could reverse by legislation the FEC's narrow interpretation of 
existing disclosure requirements. Of course, entities that engage in non-electoral 
as well as electoral activity would likely resist such broad disclosure. To ac-
count for this, Briffault proposes permitting organizations that wish to engage in 
both sorts of activities to set up nonelectoral accounts, with contributions to 
such accounts not subject to disclosure.263 
3. Data Processing 
Providing every donor with a unique donor-identification number would 
allow researchers and informational intermediaries to track individual contribu-
tors with a degree of confidence and without significant data cleaning.264 
Another, more practical possibility would be to require additional identifying 
information (for example, date of birth and last four digits of one's social 
security number) with each contribution that could be combined after a donation 
to produce a synthetic identifier. For instance, a synthetic identifier could com-
bine the legal surname, date of birth, partial social security number, and gender 
of the contributor.265 Such an identifier would allow regulators and informa-
tional intermediaries to track donors over time without requiring that contribu-
tors provide their identification number with each contribution. 
The patterns in a unique donor's contribution history-such as what types of 
261. 2 u.s.c. § 434(f) (2012). 
262. 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9) (2012). 
263. See Briffault, Updating Disclosure, supra note 3, at 698. 
264. The FEC already, in fact, assigns unique identification numbers to candidates for office and 
PACs. Detailed Files About Candidates, Parties and Other Committees, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, 
http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/ftpdet.shtml (last visited Feb 3, 2014). Similarly, the SEC assigns 
corporations and individuals Central Index Keys (CIKs) for inclusion in publicly available disclosure 
filings. I SEC. & ExcH. CoMM'N, EDGAR FILER MANUAL§ 4.1 (2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/ 
edgar/edgarfm-vol 1-v 15 .pdf. 
265. Studies have shown that a large majority of Americans can be identified by a combination 
of simple identifiers. For instance, one study using 1990 Census data found that "87% (216 million of 
248 million) of the population in the United States had reported characteristics that likely made them 
unique based only on {5-digit ZIP, gender, [and] date of birth}." Simple Demographics Often Identify 
People Uniquely 2 (Carnegie Mellon Univ., Data Privacy Working Paper No. 3, 2000). An updated 
study of 2000 Census data estimated that 63% of the population could be identified given ZIP code, 
gender, and birth date. Philippe Golie, Revisiting the Uniqueness of Simple Demographics in the US 
Population, in PRoc. 5TH ACM WORK. ON PRiv. ELEc. Soc. 77, 77 (2006). For another treatment, see 
generally Michael P. McDonald & Justin Levitt, Seeing Double Voting: An Extension of the Birthday 
Problem, 7 ELECTION L.J. 111 (2008). 
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races or candidates a donor supports over time-might allow voters to better 
assess the meaning of a donor's support for a particular candidate. Ideally, 
this would apply to campaigns, PACs, and outside entities engaged in political 
activity. Such a requirement would genuinely enable researchers and informa-
tional intermediaries to track the overall activity of individual contributors, and 
especially the contributors who make the most contributions.266 
The introduction of a donor-identification infrastructure may also be crucial 
to both setting the campaign finance reform agenda and implementing proposed 
reform legislation. For instance, the absence of a central donor-identification 
scheme has prevented the calculation and dissemination of basic "social facts" 
about the contours of political influence in American elections, like the amount 
or overall percentage of contributions candidates for office receive from donors 
who have "maxed out" to a particular candidate. And recent reform efforts that 
seek to magnify the impact of donations from average Americans through 
voucher programs would, in fact, necessitate an infrastructure for centrally 
tracking individual donors. The Grassroots Democracy Act of 2013 proposed by 
Representative John Sarbanes (D-MD), for instance, would provide Americans 
twenty-five dollars in "grassroots democracy dollars" (via a refundable tax 
credit) to be distributed to candidates for congressional office. The legislation, 
however, would disqualify any donor who has already made an aggregate 
contribution of $200 or more to "any single Federal congressional candidate" or 
"any political committee established and maintained by a national political 
party."267 Such a voucher scheme would necessitate tracking each donor within 
an election cycle and linking eligibility criteria to IRS tax records. Without a 
donor-identification infrastructure administered by the FEC, it is difficult to see 
how such a proposal could be implemented. 
The implementation of a donor-identification scheme could, however, raise a 
number of privacy concerns, especially for contributors who contribute only 
small sums. A potential solution to these concerns is to collect donor informa-
tion but only disseminate a partially de-identified, "semi-disclosure" database to 
the public, with names of small contributors stripped from the final data 
release.268 Proposals for semi-disclosure regimes, in fact, presuppose an infra~ 
structure for tracking individual contributors. Under a semi-disclosure regime, 
266. And after McCutcheon , tracking the largest and most consistent individual contributors will be 
more important than ever. Mccutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
267. Grassroots Democracy Act of 2013, H.R. 268, I 13th Cong. § 36C(b)(2)(A) (2013). 
268. For an argument in favor of "semi-disclosure," see Bruce Cain, Shade from the Glare: The 
Case for Semi-Disclosure, CATO UNBOUND (Nov. 2010), http://www.cato-unbound.org/print-issue/457. 
Another proposal, by Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres, would go still further, completely anonymizing 
donations to both the public and to the candidates who receive them. Ackerman and Ayres argue that 
making the source of donations completely anonymous would "deter political corruption" by "mak[ing] 
it more difficult for politicians to reward their contributors." Ian Ayres, Should Campaign Donors Be 
Identified?, 24 REG. 12, 12, 14 (2001). See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH 
DoLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002). For a trenchant critique of this proposal, see 
LESSIG, supra note 157, at 260--63 . 
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only "large" donors would be subject to full disclosure of the sort the current 
regime now requires for all donors over $200. 
If the FEC were to implement such a disclosure regime, donors might also be 
asked to provide additional, more fine-grained sociodemographic information 
with their contributions. For instance, donors could be required to report basic 
information-routinely collected by the Census Bureau-such as race, gender, 
and highest level of education completed. A semi-disclosure regime could 
simultaneously address privacy concerns and provide voters with a more robust 
portrait of the composition of a candidate's financial constituency-that is, it 
might better serve the informational interest. 
4. Data Dissemination 
Finally, we propose that the FEC's disclosure regime might be expanded to 
disseminate information of the sort Justin Levitt has termed "Democracy Facts" 
about individual candidates and elected representatives. 269 Although Levitt 
envisions "Democracy Facts" as disclaimers for political advertisements, we 
suggest that a modified version of "Democracy Facts" could also be used to 
distill basic information about candidate financing from the FEC's large-scale 
disclosure database itself. Voters might be able to look up the name of a 
particular candidate for office or elected representative to retrieve a candidate 
fact sheet including the total amount and percentage of receipts the candidate 
received from donors of various sizes, the total amount and percentage of 
receipts the candidate received from donors who have contributed in past 
election cycles, and the corresponding occupational and industry breakdowns of 
these donor groups. Such "Democracy Facts" might also include baseline 
comparisons to other candidates running for the same office, as well as the 
candidate's vote records, if available. For instance, voters might want to know if 
their congressional representative receives more or less money from donations 
in sums over a particular threshold or from a particular industry, compared to 
other representatives in Congress. And they might also want to compare pat-
terns in funding to patterns in a member's roll call vote history. The dissemina-
tion of "Democracy Facts" by the FEC would thus satisfy the goals of providing 
voters with readily interpretable and credible information by which to judge 
candidates and elected representatives. 
B. DISCLAIMER REQUIREMENTS 
Many of the above suggestions for disclosure reform apply with equal weight 
to recommendations for disclaimers. Again, disclaimers generally appear along-
side an advertisement sponsored by a group or an individual. Since voters are 
made immediately aware of who is responsible for an ad, disclaimers, in theory 
at least, allow voters to instantly evaluate the content of a message based on the 
269. Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 217,228 
(2010). 
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speaker's identity.270 And as social science has shown, the comprehensibility 
and credibility of such information sets important limits on its efficacy.271 
But at present, nearly all third-party funders of campaign advertisements 
conceal their identities---or the interests they represent272 -by adopting noninfor-
mative, benign, or patriotic-sounding names for their organizations.273 To name 
just a few, American Crossroads,274 Local Voices,275 America's Next Genera-
tion,276 and America Shining277 all made independent expenditures in the 2012 
cycle to enact highly ideological agendas despite rather innocuous names.278 
These entities did comply with BCRA's disclaimer requirements, but to no 
genuine advantage for voters. 
More meaningful disclosure on political ads themselves, in the form of better 
and fuller disclaimer requirements, is another important step toward achieving 
the purposes disclosure serves. As the authors of Full Disclosure explain, 
"Policies are most effective when they match information content and formats 
to users' levels of attention and comprehension. "279 
Beyond simply disclosing the name and address of the group sponsoring the 
ad, groups might be required to craft a mission or policy statement, much like 
organizations submitting amicus curiae briefs in the Supreme Court customarily 
provide in the description of the "interest of amicus curiae" required by 
Supreme Court rules. Citizens United, for example, described itself in its filings 
in the Supreme Court (albeit as a party) this way: "Through a combination of 
education, advocacy, and grass-roots programs, Citizens United seeks to pro-
mote the traditional American values of limited government, free enterprise, 
270. See Hasen, supra note 3, at 560 ("[C]ampaign finance data, especially when included on the 
face of campaign advertising, provides an important heuristic cue helping busy voters decide how to 
vote."). 
271. Cf FuNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 13, at 59. 
272. These groups have been referred to as "veiled political actors" or "VPAs." Garrett & Smith, 
supra note 172, at 296. 
273. The degree to which such groups seem to choose deliberately noninformative names strongly 
suggests that such entities believe that the public might derive some benefit-perhaps to the detriment 
of such campaign spenders-from more informative or descriptively accurate names. 
274. See American Crossroads Outside Spending Summary 2012, CENTER FOR REsPONSIVE PoLmcs, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/detail.php?cmte=C00487363&cycle=20l2 (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2014) (American Crossroads spent against Democratic candidates). 
275. See Local Voices Outside Spending Summary 2012, CENTER FOR REsPONSIVE PoLmcs, http://www. 
opensecrets.org/outsidespending/detail.php?cmte = C0053 l 624&cycle= 2012 (last visited Feb. 14, 20 l 4) 
(Local Voices spent to support incumbent President Barack Obama). 
276. See America's Next Generation Outside Spending Summary 2012, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE 
PoLincs, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/detail.php?cmte = C0049 l 373&cycle= 2012 (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2014) (America's Next Generation opposed incumbent President Barack Obama). 
277. See America Shining Outside Spending Summary 2012, CENTER FOR REsPONSIVE PoLmcs, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/detail. php?cmte = C00525618&cycle = 2012 (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2014) (America Shining spent in favor of Democratic candidates and against Republican 
candidates). 
278. See 2012 Outside Spending, by Super PAC, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS http://www.open 
secrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle = 20 l 2&chrt = V &type= S (last visited Feb. 14, 2014 ). 
279. FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 13, at 178. 
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strong families, and national sovereignty and security. "280 Such information 
could help familiarize voters, at least to some degree, with the ideological 
objectives of funders of campaign ads. These short "mission statements" could 
appear alongside the groups' standard disclaimers and help familiarize voters 
with sponsoring entities. Disclaimers might also include the names of the top 
five donors and the percentage of the sponsoring organization's funds from 
these donors, as Levitt recommends. 281 
Writing in the context of ballot initiatives-but quite applicable in the can-
didate context-Elizabeth Garrett and Daniel Smith explain the following: 
For group-support to serve as a heuristic ... three conditions must be met. 
First, voters must correctly associate the group with a particular ideology or 
policy position that allows them to draw accurate inferences about the conse-
quences of a vote for or against [the candidate in question]. Second, the 
information conveyed by the group's support must be credible. Third, voters 
must be able to learn of the group's support at a time when it can affect their 
decisions. 282 
Improved disclaimer requirements must take all of these conditions seriously. 
C. ENFORCEMENT 
The viability and credibility of the disclosure system, and the extensions or 
revisions to it detailed here, are contingent on effective enforcement of cam-
paign finance disclosure laws. At present, donors self report information of 
dubious accuracy and authenticity and often fail to report mandatory informa-
tion at all. As detailed above, political committees and independent spenders 
might be compelled to provide greater disclosure from their donors if complete 
donor information were a precondition of accepting a contribution. 
But an effective disclosure regime would likely also mean enhancing the 
FEC's enforcement authority, including the expansion of all enforcement pro-
grams beyond just political candidates, committees, and their contributors. In 
2000, the FEC implemented a new enforcement program-designed to supple-
ment the civil-enforcement process outlined in section III.A.--called the Admin-
istrative Fine Program. 283 The Administrative Fine Program creates a streamlined 
280. Brief for Appellant at 5, Citizens United v. FEC, 588 U.S . 310 (2010) (No. 08-205). 
281. See Levitt, supra note 269, at 227 (proposing the creation of a "Democracy Facts" label 
"emphasizing simple proxies for the quantity and fervor of local support for a particular communica-
tion," including the number of supporters in a given jurisdiction, as well as the percentage of support 
given by top donors). For a visual demonstration of Levitt's proposal, see http://electionlawblog.org/ 
archives/DemocracyFacts.html. 
282. Garrett & Smith, supra note 172, at 297. 
283. See Administrative Fine Program, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/af/af.shtml 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2014); see also Bradley A. Smith & Stephen M. Hoersting, A Toothless Anaconda: 
Innovation, Impotence and Overenforcement at the Federal Election Commission, l ELECTION L.J. 145, 
147 & n.17 (2002). 
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process by which the FEC can levy fines on political committees that file late 
disclosure reports or fail to file disclosure reports at all. 284 The FEC could 
extend such a program to also fine political committees and independent 
spenders that fail to supply complete information for a specified threshold of 
reported contributions. 
Analyses of the LECD also indicate that individual contributors in federal 
elections have routinely exceeded the aggregate contribution limits set forth in 
PECA and amended by BCRA. According to FEC materials, the Commission's 
Reports Analysis Division (RAD) reviews incoming "statements and financial 
reports filed by political committees participating in Federal elections."285 
When "an error, omission, need for additional clarification, or prohibited activ-
ity ... is discovered in the course of reviewing a report, the [RAD] sends the 
committee a letter which requests that the committee amend its report, take 
corrective action, or provide further information concerning a particular prob-
lem."286 In addition, alleged violations may also be reported sua sponte or made 
by outside complainants. 287 
Despite these various avenues to enforcement, violations of aggregate contri-
bution limits remained pervasive when such limits were in effect. For instance, 
the LECD indicates that 537 individual contributors donated in excess of the 
election-cycle maximum between the 2003-2004 and 2007-2008 cycles. Over 
the same period, the FEC reports that only 158 potential violations of the 
aggregate limits were adjudicated through the FEC's formal enforcement pro-
cess288 and less than twenty additional violations were settled through the 
FEC's Alternative Dispute Resolution program, which facilitates negotiated 
settlements without a formal enforcement review.289 Thus, we estimate that only 
a third of the aggregate-limit violations depicted in Figure 3 resulted in any type 
of enforcement action, with the vast majority of such violations undetected and 
unreported. 
Restoring the FEC's ability to conduct random audits might significantly 
284. As the FEC explained in its final rule creating the program, " [a]llowing the FEC to impose 
administrative fines for reporting violations without the lengthy procedural steps required in a normal 
enforcement case will free critical FEC resources for more important disclosure and enforcement 
efforts." Administrative Fines, 65 Fed. Reg. 31,788 (May 19, 2000) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pts. 
104, 111). 
285. FEC, OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE OVERVIEW-ENFORCEMENT HEARING l (2009), available at http://www. 
fec .gov/ern/enfpro/complistatsfy05-08 .pdf. 
286. Id. 
287. See FEC, GUIDEBOOK FOR COMPLAINANTS AND RESPONDENTS ON THE FEC ENFORCEMENT PROCESS 5 
(2012), available at http://www.fec .gov/ern/respondent_guide.pdf. 
288. See FEC, OGC ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS 5 (2008), available at http://www.fec.gov/ern/enfpro/ 
enforcestatsfy03-08.pdf. 
289. This statistic was calculated by searching the FEC's Enforcement Query System for violations 
of section 44l(a) that were settled through Alternative Dispute Resolution. Each of the resulting cases 
in the search was manually reviewed for the subject of the violation, and only violations involving 
excessive contributions from individuals were counted toward the total. For access to the Query 
System, see FEC ENFORCEMENT QUERY SYSTEM, http://eqs.nictusa.com/eqs/searcheqs. 
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improve compliance with all campaign finance regulations, including disclosure 
requirements.290 As others have noted, "the prospect of candidates and contribu-
tors being audited more frequently and unpredictably would presumably encour-
age a higher level of compliance."291 
Perhaps more importantly, adopting a more systematic approach to dis-
closure itself-by, as we note above, systematizing disclosure forms, instituting 
a unique donor identification number, or requiring additional pieces of identify-
ing information with a contribution-would greatly enhance the quality of 
information available to the electorate and aid the enforcement process. At 
present, however, violations are only infrequently, and inconsistently, met with 
sanctions.292 And as others have noted, "[a]ny disclosure system without real 
sanctions invites abuse."293 More importantly, we suggest that this lack of 
enforcement may compromise the credibility of the disclosure regime, and, in 
so doing, diminish the efficacy of disclosure data in informing the electorate. 
CONCLUSION 
Legislative, popular, and even judicial calls for more disclosure in a post-
Citizens United world are well-founded but incomplete. Standing alone, more 
disclosure will not work. Disclosure needs to be very different, and much better, 
if it is to achieve the goals the Supreme Court has articulated for it-chief 
among them "enabl[ing] the electorate to make informed decisions and give 
proper weight to different speakers and messages. "294 
Although the reality of our current disclosure regime falls far short of the 
Supreme Court's rhetoric, we suggest that the policy recommendations detailed 
above would considerably enhance the electorate's access to quality information 
about the contours of political influence in our democracy.295 There remains 
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ern/enfpro/complistatsfy05-08.pdf. Each election cycle the FEC aims to undertake forty to fifty of these 
audits; FEC documents show that in 2008, forty-eight "for cause" audits were completed. Id. 
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292. We should note here that we do not consider the criminal enforcement of the campaign finance 
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potential criminal liability for individuals who knowingly and willfully violate the campaign finance 
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much work to be done on the electorate's likely relationship with, and interpreta-
tion of, disclosure data. And research must focus on ways that disclosed 
information may effectively become "'embedded' in the everyday decision-
making routines of information users."296 
Writing broadly about transparency policy, the authors of Full Disclosure 
note, "openness evolves through political struggle in continuous competition 
with valu.es that favor secrecy, beset by practical difficulties in making informa-
tion truly accessible, outpaced by disclosers' discoveries of new loopholes, and 
challenged by changing markets and public priorities."297 
In the future, the conversation about disclosure, among reformers and legisla-
tors alike, should take seriously the on-the-ground reality of disclosure. Disclo-
sure is a significant regulatory technique in and of itself and may well be a 
necessary antecedent to other campaign finance policy changes, such as the 
"democracy dollars" legislation currently under consideration in the House.298 
Much work remains to be done if disclosure is to truly achieve the objectives 
the Court and reformers have envisioned for it. 
[E]specially in the Internet era, campaign finance disclosure data can serve an important 
public function in helping voters make choices consistent with their interests. Voters looking 
for reliable campaign finance information are faced with information overload; a recent 
Google search for Mitt Romney returned 189 million results. Campaign finance data are 
especially reliable evidence as to who backs a candidate. If voters know who puts their money 
where their mouth is, they will be able to make more intelligent estimates about the policy 
positions of candidates. 
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